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Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American
Law
David Marcus ∗
ABSTRACT

The term “trans-substantive” refers to doctrine that, in form and manner
of application, does not vary from one substantive context to the next. Transsubstantivity has long influenced the design of the law of civil procedure, and
whether the principle should continue to do so has prompted a lot of debate
among scholars. But this focus on civil procedure is too narrow. Doctrines that
regulate all the processes of American law, from civil litigation to public
administration, often hew to a trans-substantive norm. This Article draws
upon administrative law, the doctrine of statutory interpretation, and the law
of civil procedure to offer a more complete account of trans-substantivity that
explains the principle in all of the contexts in which it surfaces. This inquiry
leads to a novel defense of trans-substantivity as a principle of doctrinal design.
Trans-substantivity is justified as a response to deficits in the performance of
institutions that craft and administer interpretive, procedural, and
administrative law. This defense not only challenges the prevailing skepticism
in procedural scholarship regarding the principle’s normative appeal. It also
provides a metric to determine when doctrine should remain trans-substantive,
and when doctrine may legitimately splinter into substance-specific strains.
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INTRODUCTION
Frank Ricci’s suit for employment discrimination against the
New Haven Fire Department was extraordinary. 1 Very few cases get
to the U.S. Supreme Court, much less remake an emotionallycharged, often-politicized area of law. But the suit was also ordinary.
Ricci first requested help from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), as 80,000 people do each year. 2 He then
commenced a lawsuit in the District of Connecticut using a form of

1. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
2. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 16,
2013).
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complaint that differed in no material respect from one for a simple
tort action or another for complicated antitrust claims. 3 To decipher
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court majority
invoked the same canon of construction that the Court had deployed
two days before the opinion’s release to interpret the False Claims
Act,4 and that a federal district court would use the next day for the
Wiretap Act of 1968. 5 The various courts handling Ricci’s case also
had to figure out what deference they owed to the EEOC’s
interpretation of Title VII, a problem of the sort that the Supreme
Court has encountered over one thousand times since the mid1980s, in cases involving a vast array of agency actions. 6
Something interesting lies in this ordinariness. Title VII may
have provided the relevant legal regime to determine whether the
NHFD’s promotion practices injured Ricci. But three species of
doctrine—the law of federal civil procedure, federal administrative
law, and statutory interpretation doctrine—regulated the processes
by which the EEOC and several federal courts resolved his dispute.
Many of the rules that constitute these species are trans-substantive:
these rules’ form and manner of application do not vary depending
upon the antecedent legal regime that the dispute implicates,
whether it is Title VII, the Sherman Act, or Connecticut tort
doctrine. To support its use of the interpretive canon, the Supreme
Court in Ricci v. Destefano cited a case involving the allocation of
liability for cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. 7 A dissenting
justice used a deference standard for the EEOC’s interpretation of
Title VII that originated in a case involving the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Interstate Commerce Act. 8 Ricci styled his
complaint pursuant to a generic rule that does not impose any

3. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
4. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (using
the rule against surplusage).
5. United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, No. 07-CR-171, 2009 WL 1873657, at *10 (E.D.
Wis. June 30, 2009).
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008).
7. Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009) (citing United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007)) (using rule against surplusage).
8. Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing a deference standard set in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971), which in turn cited United States v. City of Chicago, 400
U.S. 8 (1970)).
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particular pleading obligation on employment discrimination
plaintiffs. 9
Trans-substantivity is one of the most fundamental principles of
doctrinal design for modern civil procedure, 10 and it has prompted
an extensive body of commentary since Robert Cover coined the
term in 1975. 11 Although abundant, this literature suffers from two
significant and related limitations. First, with few exceptions,
scholars have examined trans-substantivity exclusively as the
principle influences the development and form of procedural
doctrine. 12 This focus is too narrow. The legal processes of courtbased litigation and public administration constantly intersect and
overlap, as they did for Ricci, and trans-substantive rules often
govern administrative and interpretive issues, not just procedural
ones. Trans-substantivity is a phenomenon of process generallyconceived, not just one of court-based procedure.
The second shortcoming follows from the first. Consistent with
their constrained gaze, commentators have evaluated transsubstantivity in terms of problems of civil procedure and their
possible solutions. Some have argued, for example, that the
principle’s rigidity creates regrettable litigation costs, because transsubstantive doctrine produces wasteful discovery in cases that would
proceed better if governed by tailored rules. 13 This sort of analysis,

9. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
10. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
535, 536 [hereinafter Burbank, General Rules].
11. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718 (1975); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375–76 nn.25–26 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus,
Trans-Substantivity] (citing articles).
12. Administrative law scholarship includes plenty of discussion of what doctrine should
be in specialized areas like patent or tax law, but not systematic inquiries into transsubstantivity more generally. See, e.g., Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831 (2012); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007). A couple
of studies of trans-substantivity in criminal procedure have been written. See, e.g., William J.
Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV.
842 (2001). One scholar of statutory interpretation has questioned his field’s trans-substantive
assumption, but in a way that uses the term “trans-substantive” differently than I do here. See
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025
(1998) (arguing against “trans-substantive” interpretive doctrine, but implicitly suggesting that
“administrative law” is a substance-specific category). Otherwise, the term “trans-substantive”
tends to be used casually, without much discussion, except in procedural scholarship.
13. Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective
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however valuable, is incomplete. Trans-substantive doctrine
regulates aspects of all sorts of processes, judicial and administrative
alike, and concerns particular to the procedural regulation of civil
litigation do not exhaust the range of justifications for or arguments
against the principle.
This Article is the first to explain and defend trans-substantivity
as it influences the design of what I call “process law,” a category
that includes the various species of doctrine that govern decisionmaking processes in American law. I make three contributions. First,
I offer a more complete and accurate account of the principle than
those found in previous scholarly efforts, which have described
trans-substantivity solely in terms of civil procedure.
Second, by inquiring into the reasons for and against the
principle in process law generally and not civil procedure narrowly, I
move past decades-old debates over the normative justification for
trans-substantivity and arrive at a novel defense of its persistence.
Trans-substantivity, I argue, responds to a set of institutional deficits
that can degrade the quality of procedural, interpretive, and
administrative doctrine that judges fashion. The principle strengthens
the legitimacy of this process law, protects it from inexpert or biased
manipulation, and enables it more effectively to achieve desired
policy objectives. Rooted in observations about comparative
institutional competence, my justification challenges the prevailing
skepticism regarding the normative appeal of trans-substantivity. 14
Third, my justification for trans-substantivity has important
implications for doctrinal design. Process law is by no means
uniformly trans-substantive, as illustrated by the particularized
pleading standard that applies in securities fraud litigation, 15 or the
idiosyncratic interpretive practices courts use for the Taft-Hartley
Act.16 A recurring and important question for the development of
procedural, interpretive, and administrative law asks whether a

Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 45–46 (1994).
14. Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV.
319, 334 (2008) (arguing that “the optimal level of generality” for procedural rules “should be
determined not by reference to some trans-substantive ideal, but by balancing the costs and
benefits of general versus more specific rules”).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1)(B) (2006).
16. E.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are
“Common-Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyam
Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013) (draft at 1–2).
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particular doctrine should remain trans-substantive or assume a
substance-specific form. Commentary on trans-substantivity that
covers only procedural terrain provides no general metric to guide
responses. My account offers a way to evaluate the legitimacy of
substance-specific process law that judges craft. As courts make this
doctrine, they can properly deviate from the trans-substantive norm
under circumstances that enable them to overcome the institutional
limitations that otherwise counsel in favor of trans-substantivity.
My Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I define “process law,”
defend my choice to treat trans-substantivity as a phenomenon of
process law generally, and explore the meaning of “transsubstantivity.” I describe trans-substantivity’s entrenchment in midtwentieth century procedural and administrative doctrine in Part II.
This history is relevant for two reasons. The similar courses the
principle followed in procedural and administrative contexts confirm
that trans-substantivity emerges from and responds to forces that are
not peculiar to civil procedure. Also, institutions and their
constraints play a significant role in trans-substantivity’s twentieth
century experience, a fact that should at least inform an account of
the principle going forward. The history leads to Part III, in which I
offer my institutional justification for trans-substantivity in judgemade process law. I close in Part IV with some implications that my
account has for the design of procedural, administrative, and
interpretive doctrine.
I. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITIES
Process law is a new term, and I need to explain why it offers a
useful and coherent category for the analysis of trans-substantivity in
procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine. In this Part, I
define “process law” and give several reasons to support an account
of trans-substantivity pitched at its level. I also explain what I mean
by “trans-substantivity,” a shape-shifting term that lacks a settled
meaning in existing commentary.
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A. Process Law

1. The term
A lot of law—Equal Protection doctrine, 17 Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence,18 remedies law, 19 and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), 20 for instance—gets saddled with the label
“trans-substantive.” Even tort law arguably qualifies. Negligence
purports to cover many varieties of unintended interactions, ranging
from surgical mishaps to car crashes. If each type of accident
constitutes its own substantive category, then tort law is transsubstantive. An attempt to explain the principle everywhere it
arguably surfaces would quickly spin out of control, or at best yield
little more than the trivial observation that legal categorization
requires abstraction.
I limit my study of trans-substantivity to its many manifestations
in what I call “process law.” Procedural, administrative, and
interpretive doctrine all regulate the legal processes of public
administration and court-based litigation. An event or set of
circumstances with potential legal meaning or significance happens
or evolves. A legal process begins in order to resolve this uncertain
state of affairs. Public processes 21 include civil litigation like the case
Ricci pursued. They also include various types of agency actions,
ranging from informal rule-making to decisions by customs agents to
fix tariffs for imports at ports of entry. The law that regulates these
processes is, logically enough, what I mean by “process law.” 22
17. See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2002).
18. Stuntz, supra note 12, at 842.
19. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006) (applying
“well-established principles of equity” to determine when an injunction might be issued, and
implying that different principles should not apply in patent cases); EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R.
RE, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xv–xxiv (6th ed. 2005) (organizing the subject of
remedies around substantive categories). But cf. David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an
Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV.
627, 631–32 (1988) (arguing that remedies law is “compartmentalized” based on substance but
should not be).
20. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, Preserving Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory
Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 659 n.108 (1991) (describing NEPA as
trans-substantive).
21. Plenty of legal processes, like mediation and arbitration, are private. I exclude them
from my analysis and only address public processes.
22. This definition excludes remedies law, which doesn’t regulate legal processes but
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I use this term instead of “procedure,” the obvious alternative,
for several reasons. “Procedure” has connotations that do not reflect
what process law encompasses and what it does. The ordinary
meaning of “procedure,” for example, usually does not include
interpretive doctrine. 23 Also, “procedure” conjures up the
substance/procedure divide, a dichotomy that does not account for
the problems that process law often confronts. A process is legal
because it implicates an antecedent regime of law, like Title VII in
Ricci’s case. Many of the challenges that process law encounters
arise from its intersection with the antecedent regime. Should a
federal court apply New York’s rule that prohibits class actions for
the enforcement of a particular insurance law, or does Rule 23
preempt state law? 24 The procedural determination has obvious
substantive ramifications, and thus the problem may fairly be
understood as one involving the collision between “substance” and
“procedure.” 25
But analogous problems arising in legal processes often have
nothing to do with procedure’s relation to substance. Process law
can uncomfortably intersect with antecedent regimes that
themselves are entirely procedural. The Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA), for example, provides that, upon a case’s removal to federal
court, a plaintiff can appeal “not less than 7 days” after the district
court denies her motion to remand. 26 This language appears to
authorize an indefinite time to appeal and, as such, is a drafting
error. “Less” in this instance really means “more.” 27 But the fact that

instead is in some fashion the concrete actualization of substantive law. See Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (1979) (describing remedies as the
means for actualizing rights upon their articulation); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585, 678–79 (1983) (arguing that remedial possibilities shape the articulation of
constitutional rights); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 931 (1999) (“When a common law court decides rules about what constitutes a
breach of a contract or a tort, and when it decides what remedy is warranted for the breach or
tort, . . . the two decisions are based on the same sorts of considerations.”).
23. By interpretation I do not mean to refer to interpretation in the literary theory sense
of the term. By this meaning of interpretation, adjudication is arguably a form of interpretation.
See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1982).
24. See generally Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010).
25. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 68–74 (2010).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006).
27. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117,
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one would conventionally describe the antecedent regime (CAFA’s
removal provision) as procedural does not lessen the difficulty courts
encounter as they deploy interpretive doctrine to make sense of the
statute.28 The problem involves a clash of institutional prerogatives:
does process doctrine—in this instance practices of statutory
interpretation—give courts legitimate authority to rewrite an
otherwise-clear text Congress enacted?
A better description of process law, one that gets beyond the
substance/procedure dichotomy, defines it, first, in terms of a
relational trait, and second, in terms of the tasks that process law
discharges. The relational trait has to do with process law’s
necessary connection to an antecedent legal regime. Before a rule of
process law has any operational meaning, in terms of how it affects
decision-maker or participant behavior, a set of circumstances
implicating some legal regime must emerge. Some sort of legal
process must commence to resolve authoritatively these
circumstances’ legal significance. An example comes from statutory
interpretation. The ejusdem generis canon provides that the meaning of
a general term at the end of a list in a section of a statute takes on
the meaning of the more precise terms that precede it. 29 On its own,
the canon has no real meaning. Once a merchant plans to build a gas
station in Montgomery Township, Pennsylvania, however, the canon
becomes important. A zoning ordinance there permits the operation
of “shops, stores, or other indoor facilities.” 30 Whether a gas station
qualifies as an “indoor facility” may depend on the canon’s
application. 31
Process law is also distinguishable in terms of the two types of
tasks it discharges. The first type of task is incontestably procedural.
The time FRCP 4 gives a defendant to answer a complaint is an
example. By no understanding of the term “substance” could the
rule, concerned entirely with the fairness and efficiency of civil
litigation, qualify. The second type of task helps to distinguish law

137–42 (2009).
28. See generally Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc.,
448 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2006) (reporting opinion of five judges dissenting from Ninth Circuit’s
refusal to rehear en banc a case involving the interpretation of this text).
29. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 253–54
(2000).
30. In re Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 A.3d 535, 538 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
31. Id. at 540 (discussing ejusdem generis).
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that regulates some sort of procedure but is not properly understood
as process law. If some doctrine performs a function that is not
incontestably procedural, it qualifies as process law only if the rights
the doctrine creates or the obligations or duties the doctrine imposes
necessarily derive, at least in part, from the antecedent regime.
The heightened pleading standard the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act prescribes for securities fraud claims, for
example, counts as process law. The pleading standard cloaks
substantive policy in procedural guise and thus uncomfortably
straddles the substance/procedure divide. 32 But the pleading
standard has operational significance only upon the occurrence of a
set of circumstances that might implicate the federal securities laws,
the relevant antecedent regime. Moreover, although the standard is
not incontestably procedural, a court cannot determine whether a
plaintiff has met the obligations it imposes without reference to
federal securities laws (the antecedent regime). NEPA, in contrast,
does not qualify as process law. NEPA obliges the federal
government to provide an environmental impact statement (EIS)
when the government wants to take certain actions “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.” 33 NEPA applies
when an agency wants to take some action pursuant to some other
statutory authority, and in this sense NEPA arguably requires an
antecedent legal regime to have operational significance. Few would
describe NEPA as incontestably procedural, since it serves
environmental policy objectives and does not simply concern itself
with the fairness or efficiency of some legal process. Also, its
objectives are not externally-determined. A decision-maker can
decide whether an agency satisfied its obligations under NEPA
without reference to the antecedent regime.34

32. E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 223 (2004) (“The
PSLRA . . . involve[s] a deliberate crossing of the line between substance and procedure.”).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
34. Recent Ninth Circuit opinions applying the EIS requirement are illustrative. In none
of them did the court anchor the EIS requirement to some other legal obligation and instead
evaluated the government’s behavior according to NEPA itself. Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power
Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2012); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 697 F.3d
1010, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012); Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 693 F.3d 1084,
1100–03 (9th Cir. 2012); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 893, 913–14 (9th Cir.
2012); League of Wilderness Defenders–Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
689 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2012).
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2. Trans-substantivity as a process law principle
For five reasons, I offer my analysis of trans-substantivity at the
level of process law, as a category embracing procedural,
administrative, and interpretive doctrine. 35 First, each of these
species includes a lot of doctrine that is incontrovertibly transsubstantive. Again, tort law is trans-substantive if “surgical
operations” and “automobile accidents” count as substantive
categories. But if the proper category is “tort,” then tort law is
substance-specific. In contrast, regardless of how one conceptualizes
substantive categories, trans-substantive doctrine composes
significant swaths of each species of process law. The realist Leon
Green famously removed arguably trans-substantive abstractions like
“negligence” and “strict liability” from his torts casebook, replacing
them with “keeping of animals,” “timber, crops, minerals,” and
other such categories.36 Charles Alan Wright identified his treatise
on federal practice as a realist equivalent for civil procedure, 37 yet it
remains organized in trans-substantive terms. Perhaps transsubstantivity is more central to doctrinal design of process law than
it is elsewhere.
Second, while court-based litigation and public administration
may differ in some fundamental ways, they often overlap, they often
merge, and they often are treated as equivalents for the pursuit of
regulatory goals. 38 Ricci’s case, involving first agency action and then
court-based litigation, is a good example of the sort of routine
overlap in the American regulatory state. 39 Securities enforcement
35. Two other species of process law include evidence law and criminal procedure
doctrine. See infra note 59.
36. LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES, at ix–xi (2d ed. 1931).
37. See Brian Leiter, A Potted History of American Legal Education and Scholarship in the 20thCentury, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (Oct. 15, 2012, 6:52 PM), http://leiterlawschool.
typepad.com/leiter/2012/10/a-potted-history-of-american-legal-education-and-scholarship-inthe-20th-century-with-special-refere.html.
38. Legal economists understand them in this way. See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 120–
22 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts), in REGULATION VS.
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). Policymakers
often do as well, as when they consciously opt for private litigation instead of bureaucratic
enforcement for a particular regulatory regime. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 15 (2010).
39. About one-third of the non-criminal cases pending in the U.S. Courts of Appeals as of
October 1, 2010 were direct appeals from administrative agencies. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
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illustrates merger, or instances when public administration proceeds
as court-based litigation. In FY 2009, for example, the Securities and
Exchange Commission brought 47% of its enforcement actions as
civil lawsuits, 40 pursuant to an organic act that gives the agency total
discretion to choose between judicial and administrative fora. 41 If
litigation and public administration often relate so closely, then
there is a good chance that similar problems arise during each
process, giving rise to similar process law doctrines. The fact that
these doctrines share a trait as fundamental as trans-substantivity
seems jurisprudentially-meaningful, not just incidental.
Third, as I argue in Part III, courts craft a lot of process law, even
in judicial systems whose judges do not enjoy broad lawmaking
powers. 42 This similarity is important once paired with the fourth
reason for process law as a proper category for study. All species of
process law enable decision-makers to affect how legal processes
realize or interfere with the policy objectives antecedent regimes
ostensibly serve. What an antecedent regime accomplishes can
depend, for example, on whether a decision-maker grants class
certification or uses the avoidance doctrine. Whether and how a
decision-maker can legitimately adjust the antecedent regime with
process law may depend on the decision-maker’s identity and its
relationship with other lawmaking institutions. Courts, for instance,
manifest anxiety when they use process law explicitly to alter an
antecedent regime. The absurdity doctrine enables courts to take
statutory language that does not make sense and construe it to mean
something that it as a textual matter cannot possibly mean. CAFA’s

COURTS 84 tbl. B-1 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. Twenty-eight percent of the civil actions filed in
the U.S District Courts in the year ending September 30, 2010, were classified as civil rights
actions, prisoner civil rights actions, prison conditions actions, forfeiture actions, immigration
actions, social security actions, and tax actions, and thus involved a federal agency in one way or
the other. Id. at 144–46 tbl. C-2. This figure assuredly undercounts the number of cases
emerging from an agency setting by a significant margin, as it excludes categories of cases that
do not necessarily involve agencies but often do. These include, for example, cases classified as
environmental actions and labor law actions, as well as the sizeable number of contract and
property cases involving the federal government as a litigant in some manner. See id.
40. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA, FISCAL 2009, at 3,
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2009.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 249 (1990).
42. Federal courts craft a lot of process law, even as they lack general common-lawmaking
powers. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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“less,” for example, can mean “more” upon the application of the
absurdity doctrine. 43 Whe courts deploy the doctrine, however, they
deny that they are rewriting the statute and insist instead that they
remain faithful to real legislative intent. 44
The opportunities that all varieties of process law create for the
adjustment of antecedent regimes, and the limits on judicial power
to use process law accordingly, counsel in favor of a justification for
trans-substantivity. I describe this justification in Part III, but for the
moment the relevant claim is that the justification works equally
well for procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine.
Fifth, the trans-substantive tendencies in procedural and
administrative doctrine share parallel histories, as I recount in Part
II. These histories suggest that the reasons for the principle’s
manifestation in each species may be similar. A failure to connect
trans-substantivity in procedural doctrine to trans-substantivity in
administrative doctrine may result in incomplete understandings of
the phenomenon and thus only partial critiques of its persistence.

B. The Trans-Substantivity Spectrum in Process Law
“Trans-substantivity” is not a new term like “process law,” but it
also needs elaboration. What counts as a trans-substantive rule of
process law may lie in the eye of the beholder, as the term gets
assigned a lot of meanings. The Manual for Complex Litigation is a
semi-official publication authored by the Federal Judicial Center that
advises judges on how to handle class actions and other complex
litigation. Part of the Manual organizes strategies for the
management of large cases around substantive categories. 45 Some
point to the Manual as evidence of a slide toward substancespecificity in procedural doctrine. 46 But the Manual does not steer
procedural doctrine into substance-specific enclaves. It has no formal
authority to establish or alter doctrine. Rather, the Manual suggests
that nominally trans-substantive rules can lend themselves to
patterns of application organized around particular antecedent
43. E.g., Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing cases).
44. E.g., State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1209 (Utah 2007). On the absurdity doctrine
and legislative intent more generally, see John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2387, 2400–03 (2003).
45. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH 517–724 (2004).
46. Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501,
1505 (1992) (describing the Manual as “a monument to non-trans-substantivity”).

1203

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/25/2014 1:26 PM

2013

regimes. This tendency may weaken the trans-substantive character
of federal procedural doctrine. But the Manual differs in kind from
something like the special pleading standard that applies in
securities fraud litigation, which formally departs from the transsubstantive norm in federal procedure.
Trans-substantivity is a matter of degree, as the following
diagram indicates:

A process rule is unambiguously substance-specific if a lawmaker
explicitly designs it with reference to a particular antecedent regime
and if it only gets used in legal processes that involve that regime.
Examples are the canon of construction that instructs courts to
construe exemptions to the antitrust laws narrowly, 47 and the
requirement that administrative law judges issue reasoned decisions
for social security disability benefit determinations. 48
At one time, the Sixth Circuit required plaintiffs in prison civil
rights cases plead that they had exhausted administrative remedies
in their complaints. This requirement is another example of an
unambiguously substance-specific rule. 49 It amounted to an
elaboration on Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”), the generic federal pleading requirement. One might thus
characterize the Sixth Circuit’s pleading requirement as a substancespecific application of a nominally trans-substantive rule. For
47. E.g., United States v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 411 F.3d 502, 509 (4th Cir.
2005).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2006).
49. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). But cf. Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (reversing the Sixth Circuit in another case).
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prisoners litigating within the Sixth Circuit, however, the exhaustion
requirement had hardened into the operative pleading standard, in
effect replacing Rule 8’s nonspecific terms with precise and
mandatory instructions plaintiffs had to follow upon pain of
dismissal.
Contestably substance-specific process law is the next category along
the spectrum. This category includes doctrine defined by reference to
a body of law that itself is not process law but is otherwise arguably
trans-substantive. Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides an example. It regulates appeals in habeas corpus
cases. If habeas corpus law is a distinct substantive category, then
Rule 22 is substance-specific. But habeas corpus law may be transsubstantive, since it involves a variety of antecedent regimes,
including criminal law and immigration law. If these discrete
regimes are the relevant substantive categories, then Rule 22 is
trans-substantive, since it regulates habeas appeals of petitioners
challenging criminal convictions as well as immigration detention.
Further along the spectrum is process law that decision-makers
articulate in trans-substantive terms, but that lends itself to regular
patterns of application that vary based upon the antecedent regime
involved. The procedural due process balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge is an example.50 The factors that determine how much
process is due in particular instances involving a threatened liberty
or property interest include “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action” and “the Government’s interest.” 51 These
inputs have no stated connection to any particular antecedent
regime. But the test generates regularized patterns of results that
organize themselves around substantive contexts. These results
readily morph into unambiguously substance-specific doctrine once
an authoritative decision-maker determines how the test balances
out for a particular antecedent regime. A tailored rule, not the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, now determines whether an
indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding gets a courtappointed lawyer, because the Supreme Court has addressed this
situation. 52

50. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
51. Id. at 335.
52. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011).
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Another example is United States v. Mead Corp., which provides a
nominally trans-substantive standard to determine which agency
interpretations of statutes trigger Chevron deference. 53 Once an
authoritative decision-maker decides how Mead applies to a
particular agency’s interpretation of a particular statute, the decision
becomes an unambiguously substance-specific rule that controls
going forward. When a single member of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) writes an unpublished opinion, his or her
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
presently receives no Chevron deference from the Third Circuit. 54
This substance-specific rule governs within the Third Circuit, not
because Mead generates the same result every time, but because the
Third Circuit’s precedent requires it.
Some nominally trans-substantive rules with routine patterns of
application resist this move towards unambiguous substancespecificity. As applied, a type of summary judgment procedure some
federal district courts use affects employment discrimination cases
differently than the ordinary run of civil actions. 55 But the applicable
rule is still trans-substantive. Neither the procedure’s terms nor
authoritative declarations of how it should apply require particular
treatment of employment discrimination cases. Rather, the manner
in which the rule interacts with recurring patterns in the litigation of
employment discrimination cases produces favorable results for
defendants more often than in other substantive contexts.
Closer toward the trans-substantivity end of the spectrum lies
doctrine that is articulated in trans-substantive terms and resists
substance-specific patterns of application, even though its authors devised
it for a particular antecedent regime. FRCP 23(b)(2), the provision
governing class certification in cases for injunctive relief, is one such
example. The rule’s creators wrote it for school desegregation
litigation. 56 But they codified their intentions in trans-substantive
53. 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
54. De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2010).
55. E.g., Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, at 9–13 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2008%20Comments%20Committee%20Folders/CV%20Comments%20
2008/08-CV-145-Comment-Burbank.pdf; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal
Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 521–22 (2010).
56. David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–11 (2011).
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terms, and since then FRCP 23(b)(2)’s coverage has extended well
beyond the civil rights context. 57
Doctrine is unambiguously trans-substantive when it has no
substance-specific origins, gets crafted in trans-substantive terms,
and does not produce regular patterns of application organized
around particular antecedent regimes. The requirement that agencies
publish notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register is one
such rule. The relation-back doctrine, governing the untimely
amendment of pleadings, is another. Norms arranging components
of a bill’s legislative history into a hierarchy of interpretive authority
is a third. Doctrines remain unambiguously trans-substantive
because the problems they address rarely arise in regularized
patterns that vary depending upon the antecedent regime involved.
There is little reason to think, for example, that antitrust claims by
their nature lead antitrust plaintiffs to file complaints outside
limitations periods routinely and thus to require particularized
applications of the relation-back doctrine.
As these points along the spectrum indicate, the labels
“substance-specific” and “trans-substantive” are too blunt. For the
sake of brevity, I will use these terms, however inadequate,
throughout this Article. When I refer to “substance-specific”
doctrine, I include unambiguously substance-specific doctrine and
nominally trans-substantive doctrine that lends itself to regularized
patterns of substance-specific application. 58 As I argue in Parts III
and IV, rules that fit in these categories pose a unique set of
problems to courts as they devise doctrine to regulate legal
processes.
II. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY’S ENTRENCHMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
For some species of process law, trans-substantivity has long
served as a central principle of doctrinal design. This is so for
evidence law.59 Trans-substantivity’s persistence reflects the long-

57. For an early example, see Nix v. Grand Lodge of the International Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. I exclude contestably substance-specific doctrine from my analysis. It poses unique
complications, because, before one can assess the wisdom of its substance-specificity, one must
first determine whether the underlying antecedent regime is itself trans-substantive or
substance-specific. This sort of assessment requires a case-by-case determination and is thus
beyond the scope of this Article.
59. D. Michael Risinger, Guilt v. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules For Trying Factual Innocence
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held belief, voiced prominently by John Henry Wigmore, that “there
is no occasion” in evidence law “for a distinction” among various
types of cases. “The relation between an Evidentiary Fact and a
particular Proposition,” Wigmore argued, “is always the same,
without regard to the kind of litigation in which that proposition
becomes material to be proved.” 60 The task of evidence law, in other
words, is inherently trans-substantive. 61 Likewise, interpretive
doctrine also discharges an inherently trans-substantive task, to the
extent that it provides rules of grammar and usage to help vest the
incomplete or indeterminate use of language with meaning. 62

Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 885, 886 (2008); David A.
Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can
Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 728–29 (2006).
60. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 4, at 11 (1904).
61. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 59, at 731–32. This being said, some evidence law has
or may splinter into substance-specific strains. E.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis,

Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and Rethinking of the Application of a Single
Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585, 1599–1606 (1998). My
sense is that the pressure on evidence law to do so is less than for procedural and administrative
doctrine. To the extent that this development proceeds, then my account in Part IV may offer a
normative metric to evaluate substance-specific evidence law going forward.
I also exclude criminal procedure from my account of trans-substantivity. It may be transsubstantive. Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7–22 (2011); Stuntz, supra note 12, at 842.
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1957 n.1
(2004) (citing sources discussing the issue of substance-specificity in criminal procedure). But I
am not sure. If “homicide” and “burglary” are the substantive categories, then criminal
procedure is trans-substantive. If “criminal law,” like “torts” or “contracts,” is the substantive
category, then criminal procedure is substance-specific. Unlike evidence law, however, if
criminal procedure is trans-substantive, it likely owes its trans-substantivity to the same set of
forces that explain the principle in procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine. See
Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 2–4
(2012).
62. E.g., THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225–90 (1857)
(summarizing major approaches to statutory interpretation, all of which expressed in transsubstantive terms). This description of interpretive doctrine’s raison d’être is hardly self-evident.
Some textualists might think it so. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25–27 (1998) (discussing semantic canons of construction). But
purposivists might not. To them, interpretive doctrines offer guides to legislative purpose, any
one of which might be more or less useful in any particular instance. E.g., William S. Blatt, The
History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 832
(1985). This understanding of interpretive doctrine is not inherently trans-substantive, and for
that reason and others, I believe that interpretive doctrine’s trans-substantivity is not as easy to
explain as, say, evidence law’s trans-substantivity.
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The reasons for trans-substantivity in procedural and
administrative doctrine may be less intuitive. For these species, the
principle has roots that extend into the nineteenth century and, in
procedure’s
case,
beyond
that.
But
trans-substantivity’s
entrenchment in each species as an explicitly-recognized,
consciously-pursued, and successful principle of doctrinal design
only happened after the New Deal. I explain this development here
for two reasons. I mentioned the first in Part I: trans-substantivity’s
parallel experiences in procedural and administrative settings
counsel in favor of an explanation of the principle that is not
narrowly-tailored to civil procedure. In addition, this history
provides a transition to my discussion of trans-substantivity’s
present-day justification in Part III. Trans-substantivity’s post-New
Deal entrenchment had much to do with institutions and their
limited competences, considerations that an understanding of transsubstantivity in process law ought to take into account.

A. Trans-Substantivity’s Ascendancy
Trans-substantivity emerged in procedural and administrative
doctrine before the New Deal. 63 Efforts to sever the link that
tethered procedural doctrine to particular common law categories
began with Jeremy Bentham and culminated with David Dudley
Field’s trans-substantive code of civil procedure that New York
adopted in 1848. Field’s achievement proved so influential that his
code, with its trans-substantive design, won recognition as the
“American system” of procedure by the end of the nineteenth
century.64 But civil procedure remained connected to substantive
categories, even in jurisdictions governed by a version of the Field
Code, as lawyers clung to the substance-specific doctrine that the
Code ostensibly replaced. 65 Indeed, at the outset of the movement
63. Jeremy Bentham conceived of procedural law as a stand-alone category, denominated
“adjective law.” Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 384–85 (describing Bentham’s
category of “adjective law”). The late 19th century treatise writers followed his lead. E.g.,
WALTER DENTON SMITH, A MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY LAW §§ 165–66 (1896) (defining substantive
and adjective law). On trans-substantivity in administrative law before the New Deal, see JERRY
L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 16, 309 (2012).
64. Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 388–89.
65. E.g., CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING 25–26 (1926) (describing the
persistence of substance-specificity in code pleading); F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS
OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 295–96 (1913); see also Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at
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that culminated with the FRCP, reformers identified uniformity in
procedure as a goal to be achieved, not one to be preserved. 66
Administrative law, such as it existed at the dawn of the
twentieth century,67 had latent trans-substantive tendencies, but
they remained in the background. Agencies developed for themselves
“internal laws of administration,” and the varieties of self-regulation
they devised had similarities from agency-to-agency. 68 But the more
visible doctrine regulating administrative processes, involving
judicial review of agency action, remained substance-specific. This
law included, in important part, claims against agency officials
rooted in common law (and hence substance-specific) causes of
action. 69
Trans-substantivity became a central principle of doctrinal design
for both species in the 1930s. The increasing complexity of the
American legal landscape pressured doctrine in both contexts to
move in trans-substantive directions, although the principle’s
political meaning for administrative law initially differed from what
the principle conveyed for procedure. The FRCP’s trans-substantivity
reflected a central goal their authors pursued—to minimize
procedural technicalities and keep the focus of litigation on the
substantive merits. 70 Also, the authors wanted to entrench expert,
apolitical rulemaking as the preferred mode for procedural reform
going forward. As I have explained elsewhere, trans-substantivity
392–94.
66. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1034–
50 (1982) (recounting this history).
67. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119
YALE L.J. 1362, 1375 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Gilded Age] (reporting that nothing was
published on administrative law “as such” until 1893); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Action – A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 197 (1991) (suggesting that
after the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 “a separate body of administrative law” began to be
recognized as “a concept”).
68. Mashaw, Gilded Age, supra note 67, at 1466; MASHAW, supra note 63, at 309.
69. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 3; Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the
Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 947–953
(2011); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 407 (2007).
70. E.g., Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase –
Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976,
976 (1937); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 974 (1987); David Marcus, The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 497
(2010).
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strengthened the case for the neutrality of procedural reform, and
thus the legitimacy of doctrinal development outside political
arenas. 71 The trans-substantivity of New Deal-era procedure also
made it flexible, a sine qua non for the changing landscape of
American law. The statute-making of the 1930s, and the
corresponding shift in the character of civil litigation, 72 made an
adaptive procedural regime essential. Some believed that the
substance-inflected procedural systems of the past had inhibited the
evolution of the substantive law, 73 a problem uniform rules not
beholden to any substantive context would solve.
The growing complexity of the federal regulatory state in the
1930s deserves direct credit for the emergence of trans-substantivity
as a central organizational principle for administrative law. Chaotic
bureaucratic growth convinced everyone from Franklin Roosevelt to
his political adversaries that administrative governance required
some kind of standardization. 74 Roosevelt’s suggestion, a
reorganization of agencies under a single chain of command leading

71. Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 397–98; see also Robert G. Bone, Making
Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324 (2008).
72. E.g., Lawrence Baum et al., The Evolution of Litigation in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
1895–1975, 16 LAW & SOC. REV. 291, 301 (1981); Wolf Hydebrand, Government Litigation and
National Policymaking, 24 LAW & SOC. REV. 477, 482–83 (1990).
73. E.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 300 (1938)
(fearing that the “undue rigidity” of prior procedural regimes would interfere with “a developing
substantive law”); see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 70, at 973–74;
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations on Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One
Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 377, 386 (2010). Cf. Emily Sherwin, The
Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 78–86 (2008);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246 (1989) (“Formulation of new theories of legal rights is
simpler, virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms of old
legal categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading.”).
74. Compare Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 789,
795 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 A.B.A. Report] (lamenting “the absence of any order or system in
the organization and functioning of the several departments, independent establishments,
boards, commissions, government-owned corporations, and other agencies”), and Report of the
Special Committee on Administrative Law, 56 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 407, 415 (1933), with Reorganization

of the Executive Departments: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report on
Reorganization of the Executive Departments of the Government, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 12, 1937,
at 2 (complaining that “[t]here are over 100 separate departments, boards, commissions,
corporations, authorities, agencies, and activities through which the work of the Government is
being carried on,” and insisting that “[n]either the President nor the Congress can exercise
effective supervision and direction over such a chaos of establishments”) [hereinafter
“Reorganization Message”].
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directly to him, 75 left conservatives apoplectic. 76 To simplify the
story, conservatives responded with draft legislation, dubbed the
Walter-Logan Bill, that proposed a uniform set of highly
cumbersome procedural requirements on all New Deal agency
activities. 77 FDR vetoed it in December 1940. He perceived the effort
as an attempt to enchain the New Deal in procedural shackles, a
reaction justified by the fact that the bill exempted most agencies
that antedated the New Deal from its coverage.78 Roosevelt may not
have had a problem with trans-substantivity for administrative
governance per se, just the rigid requirements the Walter-Logan Bill
contemplated. Identifying a connection between procedural and
administrative reform that others would recognize later, Roosevelt
compared the Walter-Logan Bill disfavorably with the transsubstantive FRCP, one of the “most significant and useful trends of
the twentieth century in legal administration.” 79

75. Reorganization Message, supra note 74, at 3. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, The
Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 93–106
(2004).
76. Dictatorship Plan Charged, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1938, at 5 (quoting Sen. Pinchot)
(describing Roosevelt’s plan as an attempt to “transform[] the government into a dictatorship”);
House Votes Veto Power Into Reorganization Bill, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 8, 1938, at 1, 7 (quoting a
House opponent to the plan, who called it “‘an escalator to a dictatorship’”); George B.
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1585 (1996).
77. 1937 A.B.A. Report, supra note 74, at 814; Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of
Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 271–73 (1978).
78. Verkuil, supra note 75, at 273 (explaining the anti-New Deal motivations of
supporters of the Walter-Logan bill); Shepherd, supra note 76, at 1580; James Landis, Crucial
Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1102 (1940); see also Letter from Robert H.
Jackson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, to the President, Dec. 11, 1940, 86
Cong. Rec. 13943, 13944 (Dec. 18, 1940) (arguing that uniformity in the regulation of public
administration “was as if we should average the sizes of all men’s feet and then buy shoes of
only that one size for the Army”). Trans-substantivity in administrative procedure retained this
partisan valence in the famed 1941 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure. On the political leanings and background of committee members, see
Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action: The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J.
POL’Y HIST. 379, 388 (2008).
79. Message from the President to the U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 18, 1940, 86
Cong. Rec. 13942, 13942. See also Robert H. Jackson, The Problem of the Administrative Process, 29
WIS. ST. BAR ASS’N REP. 155 (1939) (contrasting “court procedure” with the administrative
process).
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B. Trans-Substantivity’s Entrenchment

Trans-substantivity grew entrenched for procedural and
administrative doctrine after the war. As Henry Hart and Herbert
Wechsler observed in 1953, “uniformity as a general principle has
. . . won the day throughout the field of federal procedure.” 80 The
creeping substance-specificity that had plagued the Field Code did
not similarly distort the FRCP regime. During the 1940s and 1950s,
a modest threat came from complex antitrust cases. Some district
judges believed that this litigation suffered from particular
dysfunctions, and that procedural rules tailor-made for antitrust
claims could respond. 81 But the courts of appeals quelled the
rebellion. 82 The Federal Rules “adopted a uniform system for all
cases,” Charles Clark wrote for the Second Circuit in 1957. 83 As he
elaborated off the bench, “[i]t is neither right nor dignified for
[judges] to erode what the Congress has granted,” by erecting
procedural barriers that would interfere with the realization of the
policy objectives of the antitrust laws. 84
After World War II interrupted progress on the reform of
administrative governance, Congress, by a unanimous vote, passed
the trans-substantive APA in 1946.85 The APA created some

80. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 589 (1953).
81. New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”, 21 F.R.D. 45, 50 n.8
(1957) (citing similar cases). On the dysfunctions, see Archie O. Dawson, The Place of the
Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the “Big Case”, 23 F.R.D. 430, 431 (1958).
82. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1957); Package Closure Corp. v.
Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1944); La. Farmers’ Protective Union, Inc. v. Great
Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. of America, Inc., 131 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1942); see also United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 7 F.R.D. 338, 340 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
83. Nagler, 248 F.2d at 323.
84. Charles E. Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson’s Paper on the Place of the Pleading in a
Proper Definition of the Issues in the “Big Case”, 23 F.R.D. 435, 439 (1958); see also Clark, Special
Pleading, supra note 81, at 50 (insisting that “it is not for us to fight Congressional policy” with
particularized procedure).
85. The political meaning of the APA’s enactment is contested, and its unanimous
enactment may not reflect a bipartisan embrace of trans-substantivity in administrative law. For
contrasting interpretations of the politics of the APA’s enactment, compare James E. Brazier, An
Anti-New Dealer Legacy: The Administrative Procedure Act, 8 J. POL’Y HIST. 206 (1996), with
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180,
189–95 (1999). Contemporaries seemed to think that the idea of uniformity had won broad
acceptance by the time of the APA’s passage. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its
Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1390, 1391 (1955).
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innovations for administrative law but mostly codified a set of best
practices that agencies had developed for themselves. 86 It imposed
only “minimal procedural essentials,” in the words of one of its chief
sponsors, 87 and hardly the burdensome requirements that the
Walter-Logan Bill contemplated. 88
Still, the APA and the trans-substantive regime it created were
significant. For one thing, contemporaries understood the APA’s
trans-substantivity to prioritize a value of what I call “generality.”
This value stands for the notion that legal processes should not
target particular entities or persons for idiosyncratic treatment. In a
number of instances after the APA’s enactment, Congress legislated
particular requirements for specific agencies. 89 Opponents of this
specialized treatment invoked the APA’s trans-substantivity, as
modeling a generality value, to support their resistance. 90 These
opponents argued that the APA was supposed to ensure that all
agency processes remain yoked to general rules articulated in
advance, to keep government officials from ruling by fiat, and to

86. JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE
77–82 (2012).
87. Verkuil, supra note 77, at 277 n. 101 (quoting Sen. Pat McCarran).
88. GRISINGER, supra note 86, at 77–82.
89. E.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Committee on Judicial Review,
Special Statutory Provisions Governing Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Proceedings, Part I –
Executive Departments (Aug. 1962); S. Rep. No. 83-111 (1953) (describing various statutes
exempting particular agency processes from the APA). E.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302,
305–10 (1955) (describing Congress’s response to a decision subjecting immigration
adjudication to the APA).
90. E.g., Report of the Committee on Improvement of Administrative Procedure, 12 ADMIN. L.
BULL. 254, 254 (1960); President’s Conference on Administrative Procedure, 14 FED. COMM. B.J. 15,
15 (1955); COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK
FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 23, 32, 40–41 (Mar. 1955) (Hoover
Commission Report) (counseling against exemptions from the APA and arguing in favor of
uniform rules for administrative procedure); Alexander Wiley, Administrative Law: Further
Improvements in Agency Procedure, 34 A.B.A. J. 877, 879–80 (1948) (argument by Chairman of U.S
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in favor of uniform rules of agency procedure modeled on the
Federal Rules); Aitchison on Uniform Rules, 1 ADMIN. L. BULL. 41 (1949); Pat McCarran, Total
Justice and Administrative Procedure, 1 ADMIN. L. BULL. 15, 21 (1949); Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
Administrative Procedure: Shall Rules Before Agencies Be Uniform?, 34 A.B.A. J. 896 (1948). For
doubts about the wisdom of generality in administrative law, see, 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.02, at 515–20 (1958); George T. Washington, Are Uniform
Rules of Procedure Practicable?, 34 A.B.A. J. 1011 (1948); Committee on Administrative Law,
THE NEW DEAL

Report on the Question of Uniform Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, With Specific Reference
to the McCarran Bill, S. 527 of the 81st Congress, 4 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 244, 244 (1949).
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depoliticize the governance of public administration. 91 This concern
for generality motivated several nearly successful efforts to create a
rulemaking process for administrative procedure modeled on the
rulemaking process for the FRCP, one that would have strengthened
the trans-substantive character of administrative law even further. 92
Trans-substantivity exerted significant influence on the post-war
evolution of administrative law in the courts, in ways that
underscored the identification of trans-substantivity with this value
of generality.93 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 94 which the Supreme
Court decided in 1950, is the best example. The Court invoked the
APA’s “purpose” of “greater uniformity of procedure and
standardization of administrative practice” to justify a presumption
that the APA governed an agency’s processes absent a clear
statement from Congress otherwise. 95 The Wong Yang Sung court
held that the APA’s separation-of-functions requirement applied to
deportation proceedings, such that immigration officials responsible
for initiating these proceedings could not also adjudicate them. 96
The Court denounced how the agency had conflated these roles. In
so doing, it identified generality in administrative governance with
protection against governmental action targeting a politically
vulnerable group. 97 The Court quickly extended this preference for
generality to other administrative contexts. 98

91. GRISINGER, supra note 86, at 108.
92. Kenneth Culp Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1069 (1961) (commenting on the Eisenhower Administration’s
establishment of an Office of Administrative Procedure, created in part to recommend uniform
procedural rules when possible); S. Rep. No. 83-1953, at 2–3 (1954); Uniform Rules, 7 ADMIN. L.
BULL. 28, 32 (1954) (noting bill’s passage by the Senate); S. Rep. No. 82-403 (1951); Activities of
Sections and Committees, 37 A.B.A. J. 699, 699 (1951) (noting the bill’s passage by the Senate). Pat
McCarran had proposed similar legislation in 1949. McCarran Bill for Uniform Rules, 1 ADMIN. L.
BULL. 23 (1949). Others would propose similar legislation in 1960. Report of the Committee on
Improvement of Administrative Procedure, 12 ADMIN. L. BULL. 254, 254 (1960). On the motives for
this legislation, see GRISINGER, supra note 86, at 215.
93. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951); United States v.
Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293, 294 (D. Conn. 1949). Cf. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 238 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
94. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id. at 44–45.
97. Id. at 46.
98. E.g., Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (per curiam) (reversing a
decision holding that the APA applied to certain proceedings within the Interstate Commerce
Commission); Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (per curiam) (1951) (reversing a decision
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Several factors may have contributed to trans-substantivity’s
post-war entrenchment in both species of doctrine. The first is
straightforward. The increased complexity of American law may have
required a set of trans-substantive defaults for the regulation of
litigation and public administration. During the 1930s and
afterward, lawmakers simply could not fashion substance-specific
process law fast enough. Second, trans-substantivity, which had no
partisan valence for New Deal-era procedure, shed some of its
ideological freight by 1950 or so for administrative law. Generality as
a commitment in administrative governance probably began to
appeal more to New Dealers by the late 1940s. Their grip on the
levers of the federal bureaucracy weakened, and they could count on
having less direct legislative control over agency processes going
forward. 99 It makes sense that New Dealers would want some
baseline procedural constraint on agencies once they lost control of
the agencies themselves.
Third, trans-substantivity as a design principle neatly reflected a
more basic commitment steering the evolution of administrative law
and civil procedure during and after the war. Lawmakers trying to
reform process law can abide by a trans-substantivity norm if they
believe that that court-based litigation or public administration can
improve without explicit reference to the particular substantive
results that these processes generate. This faith in process lurked as
an unstated premise of post-New Deal administrative law. Doctrine
of this era permitted courts to regulate administrative procedure, but
it did not authorize them to meddle with the substance of agency
decision-making. 100 One of the FRCP’s chief normative

denying that the APA applied to certain proceedings conducted by the Postmaster General). See
generally William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
881, 885–88 (2006).
99. McNollgast, supra note 85, at 189–95.
100. For a representative case, where the Court denies that it can question the substance
of the agency’s decision, but where it nonetheless remands with instructions to the agency that
it compile a better record, see, for example, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197
(1941); see also Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9–10 (1942) (denying judicial power
to question the substantive wisdom of agency policymaking, but insisting that courts retain the
power to stay the enforcement of an order pending appeal); see generally Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 132 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Reuel Schiller, “St. George and the Dragon”:
Courts and the Development of the Administrative State in Twentieth Century America, 17 J. POL’Y HIST.
110, 118 (2005); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review of Procedural Decisions and the Philco Cases: Plus ÇA
Change?, 50 GEO. L.J. 661, 663 (1962); Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1942–
1951, 51 MICH. L. REV. 775, 862 (1953).
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commitments was similar: judges can regulate procedure to improve
litigation, but they should not let procedural rules disrupt the
operation of the substantive law. 101
Finally, legal process jurisprudence, which dominated American
legal thought after the war, created a fertile intellectual environment
for trans-substantivity’s entrenchment. The principle offered a
shorthand of sorts for process theory’s particular emphasis on
institutional competence and procedural quality. 102 Insofar as the
principle conveyed the idea that judges could meaningfully supervise
agency processes without control over the substance of public
administration, trans-substantivity mirrored the legal process
preference. 103 Courts are ill-equipped to question agencies’
regulatory choices, some process theorists believed. 104 But
administrative legitimacy depends upon the quality of agency
decision-making processes, something judicial oversight could
ensure.105
In litigation, ad hoc, consequentialist decision-making of the sort
that might generate a particular procedural rule for antitrust
litigation undermined adjudicative legitimacy. 106 As Lon Fuller
explained in a passage reproduced in The Legal Process materials,
“[a]djudication can be effective only when it is attended by that
minimum, formal rationality which demands a like treatment of like
cases. But the like treatment of like cases presupposes some general
principle or standard by which ‘like cases’ and ‘like treatment’ can be

101. E.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957); see also id. at 323.
102. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 953, 962 (1994) (describing institutional competence focus); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW, at li, xciv (1994).
103. See generally Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 567, 579 (1992) (“[T]he passage from the New Deal revolution to the legal process
counterrevolution is marked by the preoccupation in the late 1930s and 1940s with regularizing
agency decision making procedures.”).
104. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 400
(1978). See also HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 399–400 (excerpting Fuller’s article and
quoting his insistence that “adjudication cannot be used to decide . . . questions . . . that may
be said generally to have a ‘managerial’ quality”).
105. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1129–30 (1954).
106. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959).
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defined.” 107 Trans-substantive procedural rules could ensure that
“principles of decision applicable not only to the case in hand but to
other like cases” drove judicial decision-making.108 The quality of
the litigation process, not particular substantive results, should
matter to the application of procedural doctrine. 109
This history provides two final lessons. The first is obvious,
made all the more so by the examples of substance-specificity in
process law that appear throughout this Article. Trans-substantivity
is not in the very nature of procedural and administrative doctrine.
Its entrenchment resulted from an evolutionary process punctuated
in significant measure by the New Deal and its aftermath. Second,
reflecting legal process jurisprudence that the principle mirrored so
well after the war, 110 trans-substantivity has to do with the proper
allocation of decision-making power among government institutions
based on their respective competencies. This premise provides the
foundation for my justification of trans-substantivity as a principle of
doctrinal design.
III. A JUSTIFICATION FOR TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY IN PROCESS LAW
Plenty of process law is not trans-substantive. Specialized
requirements govern rulemaking by the U.S. Treasury, 111 plaintiffs
in medical malpractice cases often must meet particularized
procedural requirements, 112 and immigrants litigating their status
under the INA may benefit from an interpretive presumption in their
favor. 113 State and federal systems direct entire categories of
litigation, such as bankruptcy, probate, and family law, into
substance-specific silos for processing. For decades, commentators
have cited this sort of particularized doctrine to question whether
107. Fuller, quoted in HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 399; see also Kent Greenawalt, The
Enduring Significance of the Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 985–89 (1978) (elaborating
on the neutral principles idea).
108. HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 642.
109. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 512–13 (1954).
110. For a summary of central tenets of legal process theory, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 233 (1995).
111. E.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1727, 1735–40 (2007).
112. See Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 407–10.
113. E.g., Navarro v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 729, 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
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trans-substantivity remains a central principle of doctrinal design for
process law. 114
Yet significant swaths of process law remain transsubstantive. 115 Some of it is unambiguously so. Other doctrine is
nominally trans-substantive, while lending itself to regularized
patterns of substance-specific application. Even for this latter
category, decision-makers invoke trans-substantivity with some
frequency to keep doctrine from sliding toward the substancespecific end of the spectrum. The principle’s considerable, if not
overwhelming, 116 force as a constraint on procedural doctrine is

114. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 90–94 (2010); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 600 (2005); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 526 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and
State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999,
2048–51 (1989); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 499 (2011); Note, Comparative Domestic Constitutionalism: Rethinking Criminal Procedure Using
the Administrative Constitution, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2530, 2533–35 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, Of
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
693, 715 (1988).
115. A datum often invoked as a sign of disappearing trans-substantivity in civil procedure
is Congress’s decision to legislate specific procedures for prison litigation. E.g., JUDITH RESNIK &
NANCY S. MARDER, SUGGESTIONS FOR AND REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING ADJUDICATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 2 (2004) (“The trans-substantive premise of
the civil rules has been rejected through amendments made by the judiciary and by
CongressFalse. Today, national legislation, local rulemaking, and private contracting impose
different litigating requirements for certain kinds of disputes, [including] litigation about prison
conditions.”); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1562–63 (2003).
While this legislation did indeed create particularized procedures for some stages of a prison
lawsuit, it left a host of issues—the pleading standard, the legal threshold for a court’s personal
jurisdiction, and the nature of the inquiry at the summary judgment stage, to name a few—
unchanged. For trans-substantive rules regulating prison litigation in the wake of the PLRA, see,
for example, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (pleading); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d
1210, 1217–22 (10th Cir. 2010) (personal jurisdiction); Murray v. Edwards Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept.,
453 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284–85 (D. Kan. 2006) (summary judgment). Another ostensible signal
of disappearing trans-substantivity is the devolution of authority to ninety-four federal districts
to craft local rules, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1501, 1504–05 (1992); RESNIK & MARDER, supra note 115, at 2. But evidence of extensive
substance-specificity in local rules is not extensive, e.g., Joshua M. Koppel, Comment, Tailoring
Discovery: Using Nontranssubstantive Rules To Reduce Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 266
(2012); Marcus, Trans-Substantivity, supra note 11, at 427–28.
116. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) (insisting that courts take a “flexible
approach” to Rule 60(b)(5) motions addressing institutional reform decrees); Catherine Y. Kim,

Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform
Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (draft at 42).

1219

DO NOT DELETE

2/25/2014 1:26 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

evident, 117 and “the importance of maintaining a uniform approach”
likewise steers the evolution of administrative law. 118
Unless the many departures from the trans-substantive norm are
uniformly unwise, legal processes may sometimes proceed better if
regulated by substance-specific rules. Does trans-substantivity enjoy
any general justification, or does the choice between a particular
trans-substantive rule and a substance-specific alternative depend on
context-specific variables? The answer depends on the institution
involved in the law’s generation and maintenance. For court-made
process doctrine, a general justification for trans-substantivity in
doctrinal design exists. Courts suffer from institutional limitations
that have to do with their legitimacy, competency, and effectiveness
as lawmakers. Trans-substantivity ameliorates these deficits and
thereby helps improve the process law courts create and administer.

A. The Costs and Benefits of Trans-Substantivity
Trans-substantivity serves several important values. Generality is
one, as the history recounted in Part II suggests. The refusal to
discriminate among different antecedent regimes means that
regimes’ beneficiaries get treated as objects of equal concern by the
processes of American law. Adjudication, for example, proceeds
pursuant to the same set of rules for individuals alleging routine tort
claims as for corporations litigating huge commercial claims. As a
guarantor of generality, trans-substantivity can protect process law
against distortion otherwise produced by outsized political influence,

117. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009); Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777
F. Supp. 2d 893, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–
60 (2011) (rejecting a decades-old Title VII-specific application of Rule 23(b)(2)).
118. Mayo Found. for Medical Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713
(2011) (internal quotations omitted); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999); Vill. of
Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a proposed
exemption from Chevron deference for interpretations proffered by a particular agency); Cohen v.
United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a tax-specific standard for the
review of agency inaction); Dir. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dept. of Labor v.
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1994); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950). For similar sentiments expressed in the interpretation of state versions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, see, for example, Dept. of Educ. v. Kitchens, 387 S.E.2d 579, 580
(Ga. App. 1989); Rogue Flyfishers, Inc. v. Water Policy Review Bd., 62 Or. App. 412, 414 n.1
(1983); Trask v. Johnson, 452 P.2d 575, 578 (Ok. 1969). See generally In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or
Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 89, 93 (2010) (commenting on the rise and fall of a taxspecific deference standard).
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capture, or bias. Also, trans-substantive doctrine can lower the
barriers to entry for areas of practice. General rules mean fewer
advantages for legal specialists. Trans-substantivity thus helps to
enable generalist lawyers to practice in a wider array of contexts.
But trans-substantivity is not “sacred.” 119 Sometimes equal
treatment of legal processes involving different antecedent regimes
makes little sense, especially when antecedent regimes involve
particular policy problems that specially-tailored process law might
address. In such instances, an unyielding commitment to transsubstantivity can impose costs. Sometimes substance-specific
process law gives lawmakers a nuanced way to adjust the regulatory
effect of a particular antecedent regime. Instead of ending or
restricting liability for insurance companies under a consumer
protection law, for example, a state might instead decide to limit
their exposure to class action lawsuits. 120 If trans-substantivity
required the class action rule to remain indifferent to substantive
context, lawmakers could not use this procedural avenue to achieve
the desired regulatory effect.
Substance-specific doctrines may also respond to dysfunctions
from which legal processes involving particular antecedent regimes
tend to suffer. If lawmakers cannot depart from the trans-substantive
norm to address these dysfunctions, they must either let these
dysfunctions fester, or they must remedy them with an overinclusive trans-substantive response that applies unnecessarily to
processes involving other antecedent regimes. The Supreme Court’s
recent forays into pleading doctrine are a good example. The Court
first raised the federal pleading standard in an antitrust case, 121 a
move with some logic behind it. In certain instances, firm behavior
in competitive markets that smacks of conspiracy can just as likely
result from innocent activity. 122 The new pleading standard ensures
that antitrust plaintiffs cannot get to discovery, and thereby impose
significant litigation costs on defendants, with allegations that do no
more than describe legitimate self-interested conduct. But the
commitment to trans-substantivity in federal pleading law is
119. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 399, 409 n.56 (2011).
120. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 444
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing legislation in New York to this effect).
121. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007).
122. Id. at 554.
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uncompromising. 123 The Court’s decision to extend the heightened
pleading standard to civil rights cases came as a foregone
conclusion, 124 even though the particular rationale for heightened
pleading in antitrust litigation does not obtain elsewhere.
This mix of costs and benefits would seem to preclude any
generalized justification for trans-substantivity. Maybe a decisionmaker contemplating a deviation from the trans-substantive norm
for a particular problem of process law can only decide wisely if she
undertakes a contextualized assessment of the principle’s costs and
benefits. Such an assessment would include an empirical
measurement of results with the trans-substantive rule, a normative
evaluation of those results, an empirical estimate of the likely
outcomes with a substance-specific rule, and a determination of their
normative significance.

B. The Judiciary and Process Law
This doubt, that a general justification for trans-substantivity
exists, assumes that the decision-maker has the capacity to make a
good contextualized assessment of the sort I just described. But
courts do not. They suffer from a set of institutional limitations that
can disable them from legitimately, competently, and effectively
designing substance-specific process law to correct for dysfunctions,
or to fine-tune the regulatory effect of a particular antecedent
regime. Trans-substantivity, as a response to these deficits, thus
enjoys a general justification for judge-made process law. Because
courts fashion a lot of process law, this institutional justification
supports the persistence of trans-substantivity as a central principle
for doctrinal design.

1. Judicial Upkeep of Process Law
Congress creates a lot of administrative law, as statutes ranging
from the trans-substantive (the APA, the Federal Register Act, and
so on) 125 to the subject-specific (the Veterans Benefits Improvement

123.
124.
125.
(4th ed.

Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 549.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, at vii–xv
2008) (listing statutes); Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal
Administrative Rulemakings, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 536 (2000).
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Act) 126 illustrate. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which established
the institutional framework for procedural rulemaking, similarly
reflects Congress’s involvement in the creation of civil procedure
doctrine. State legislatures have enacted a multitude of interpretive
instructions. 127
Nonetheless, courts or court-supervised actors generate a lot of
process law. Statutes formally govern forum regulation for civil
litigation, and the U.S. Constitution sets baselines for acceptable
procedure. But the weight of procedural doctrine comes from courtsupervised rulemakers or in judicial opinions. 128 Even the law of
federal subject matter jurisdiction, which requires a statutory
anchor, often in reality flows from a judicial tap. 129 As for
interpretive doctrine, only recently have scholars begun to question
the judiciary’s primary role in its generation, 130 and even to treat
positively-enacted interpretive instructions as worthy of study. 131

126. 38 U.S.C. § 5121A(a)(1) (regulating the substitution of parties after a veteran’s
death); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (specifying particular requirements for EPA notice-and-comment
rulemaking); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 et seq. (regulations crafted by the Executive Office of
Immigration Review for the conduct of immigration hearings).
127. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341
(2010); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as
Labratories].
128. On procedural doctrine in state systems, see John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1367, 1431 (1986); see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV.
L.J. 354 (2003).
129. Until 1990, the law of supplemental jurisdiction was entirely judge-made,
notwithstanding the general understanding that Congress had to act to create subject matter
jurisdiction. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction,
76 VA. L. REV. 539, 546 (1990); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An
Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31, 35–41 (1992).
When the Supreme Court devised its test for when state law claims that depend in significant
measure on a federal legal issue arise under federal law for the purposes of federal question
jurisdiction, it did not bother interpreting the federal question jurisdiction statute to do so. See
generally Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Engineering, 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
130. E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2079, 2086 (2002) (“The central, unquestioned premise in [the] field [of statutory
interpretation] is that the judiciary is the proper branch to design and implement tools of
statutory interpretation.”); id. at 2088–89 (“[S]tatutory interpretation was long assumed the
exclusive province of the judiciary.”).
131. E.g., Scott, supra note 127, at 341; Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 127, at
1750; cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Justice Scalia’s Living Textualism and Our Normative Canons, __
COLUM. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 33–34) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (commenting on
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The orthodox view is that administrative law lies predominantly in
judge-made doctrine. 132 To be sure, various rules have a statutory
“hook,” but their content hardly comes from the text of a statute like
the APA through a process one could defensibly describe as statutory
interpretation. 133 Challenges to this perception of judicial
dominance have surfaced, 134 and a web of positively-enacted
instructions govern various administrative processes. Still, whatever
becomes of the orthodox view, judges in fact continue to devise and
superintend significant and core components of administrative
law. 135
Judicial responsibility for a lot of process law probably results
from institutional limitations that interfere with lawmaking activity
by coordinate branches. Often legislatures lack interest in procedural
technicalities, 136 although the importance of process law to the
effective implementation of antecedent regimes is hardly a mystery.
This general awareness, that process law holds great power over the
realization of policy objectives, makes all the more notable the
Scalia’s lack of attention to legislated instructions).
132. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2012); Jack M. Beerman, Common Law and Statute Law in
Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 115 (1999); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common
Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3–4. See generally MASHAW, supra
note 63, at 289 (describing “[t]he twenty-first century model” of administrative law as one
“whose sources are found almost exclusively in general principles derived from judicial review;
from trans-substantive statutes that apply to most, if not all, agencies; and, to a much lesser
extent, from judicial construction of the Constitution”).
133. Metzger, supra note 132, at 1299. For an example, see United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977); see also American Radio Relay League,
Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanagh, J., concurring) (insisting that the
Nova Scotia obligation, ostensibly derived from APA § 553, that agencies disclose the data they
base their rules on “cannot be squared with the text of . . . the APA”).
134. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 285–316; Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 859 (2009); Mashaw, Gilded Age, supra note 67, at 1470.
135. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical
Stories of Legal Development, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 290 (1990) [hereinafter Mashaw, Explaining
Administrative Process] (“It seems virtually undeniable that the major procedural developments in
American administrative law . . . have been the work largely of the courts or of the Chief
Executive.”).
136. The hyper-technical Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, for example, got
stuck in a five-year holding pattern because, as the House Committee Report recounts, the
House Judiciary Committee “did not have time” to focus on details of federal forum regulation.
H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 2 (2011); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found:
Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1224–25 (1996)
(commenting on legislative indifference to procedural reform in past years).
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legislative tendency to delegate process law to courts. Legislatures
routinely use a narrow range of devices, like fee-shifting provisions,
to affect the legal process for a particular antecedent regime, 137 but
they eschew many others. Congress, for example, hardly ever
specifies whether or how a bill’s legislative history can be used in
interpretation. 138
Legislative dynamics, in particular the gauntlet of vetogates a bill
must run, might explain this phenomenon. 139 General statutes like
the APA or CAFA that aim to transform significantly the governance
of a legal process have encountered great resistance. 140 Congress can
always include specialized instructions for a particular antecedent
regime in the bill establishing or amending the regime itself, but
doing so would significantly multiply the points of possible
disagreement and thus the prospect of legislative sclerosis. A
supporter of the bill might, for this reason, leave process details out.
Congress can also enact procedural, administrative, and
interpretive rules after an antecedent regime’s creation, as it did
when it crafted the pleading threshold for securities litigation in
1995, or when it prescribed rulemaking requirements for the Federal
Trade Commission in 1974. 141 These sorts of interventions are not
common, 142 presumably for the reasons just mentioned. Moreover,
137. On the efficacy of fee-shifting provisions to amplify the regulatory force of an
antecedent regime, see Sean Farhang & Douglas M. Spencer, Economic Incentives For Attorney
Representation in Civil Rights Litigation (unpublished draft, Sept. 10, 2012).
138. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 instructs courts that they cannot consider anything other
than a particular memorandum as legislative history usable in interpretation. Pub. L. No. 102166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 107 (1991). As far as I can tell, this limit is singular. Two sophisticated
treatments of legislated instructions identify this one and none other. Linda D. Jellum, “Which is
to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56
UCLA L. REV. 837, 852 (2009); Rosenkranz, supra note 130, at 2109–10. Congress’s process lawinterventions for litigation are mostly fee-shifting provisions. See generally Sean Farhang,
Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–7 (2009) (discussing these devices); Margaret H. Lemos, Special
Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 790–94 (2011) (discussing these devices).
139. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444–48 (2008). On relevant legislative dynamics generally, see generally Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 386–95.
140. On the APA’s tortured history, see generally Shepherd, supra note 76. CAFA took
eight years to get passed. See Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year
Saga is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 386–88 (2005).
141. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2183 (1974) (amending 15 U.S.C. §41).
142. E.g., Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process, supra note 135, at 280 (“Yet these
detailed and process-specific incursions into administrative process seemed dwarfed by the
degree to which the Congress acts generically and leaves the crucial details of procedural
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the iterative dynamics of lawmaking might incentivize legislators to
leave process alone as a general practice. Were a legislature regularly
to enact ideologically-inflected process law, the practice might
redound to complicate efforts to get antecedent regimes passed
going forward. A sponsor offering an amendment to weaken a
proposed statutory regime might have less credibility to a fencesitter if the fence-sitter thought the sponsor would subsequently
seek some specialized process rule to compensate for the
amendment.
Congress has often delegated the authority to regulate aspects of
their processes to agencies. 143 But agencies cannot legitimately
control certain issues of administrative law, particularly those
involving judicial review of agency action. 144 The specter of selfdealing would loom were agencies to promulgate rules to govern the
judicial interpretation of statutes they administer, 145 or to supply
procedural rules for cases they might litigate. 146
Judicial responsibility for a lot of process law might also result
from a protective sense of institutional prerogative. Process law’s
generation and maintenance may often end up in the courts by
default. But even if legislators busied themselves with process law
more often, or if agencies could legitimately promulgate more of this
law, courts might resist such encroachments onto their territory. No
procedural law fits more unambiguously in Congress’s bailiwick than
forum regulation. Even when Congress addresses a venue issue by
statute, however, judges have continued to devise and use their own
doctrine. 147 Abbe Gluck has documented judicial resistance to

implementation to agencies, courts, and perhaps the President.”).
143. F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1940); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524–25 (1978).
144. E.g., William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 251 (2009) (arguing that courts should not extend Chevron deference to
agency interpretations of the part of the APA instructing them when they must hold formal
hearings).
145. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural
Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 589–92 (2007).
146. Cf. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 657 F.3d 865, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2011)
(refusing to allow the NLRB to use an agency-devised procedure to immunize a decision from
review).
147. The best example is forum non conveniens. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract
Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973,
1010–11 (2008); see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Reconsidered, 79 NOTRE
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legislative attempts to prescribe interpretive rules. 148 In Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, the Supreme Court purportedly
constrained the authority of the federal courts to develop a common
law of administrative procedure. 149 But the federal courts continue
to do so, Vermont Yankee notwithstanding. 150

2. Trans-substantivity in judge-made process law
A justification for trans-substantivity as a principle of doctrinal
design lurks in the fact that judges make a lot of process law. To
some extent, the principle might reflect formal limits on courts’
lawmaking authority. The Enabling Act prohibits rules that “abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 151 This constraint has not
only steered rulemakers away from substance-specific proposals, 152
it also has generated a canon that counsels against substancespecificity in rule interpretation. 153 But this understanding of the
Enabling Act’s meaning is not necessarily correct. 154 Moreover, in
other process law contexts, formal restrictions on substancespecificity are weaker or nonexistent. Interpretive doctrine rarely
flows from a statutory source. The APA applies as a default unless
Congress provides otherwise, 155 but the statute does not address a
number of core issues in administrative law.156
DAME L. REV. 1891, 1893 (2004); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
543, 545–61 (1985).
148. Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 127, at 1824–27; Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal
Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 758
(2013) (“But when it comes to statutory interpretation, federal judges seem particularly
unwilling to relinquish—either to other federal courts, to state courts, or to legislatures—any
power to dictate what rules of interpretation must be applied.”).
149. 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978); see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 513–16 (2009); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990);
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT.
REV. 345, 390.
150. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
856, 882–900 (2007); see generally Metzger, supra note 132, at 1331.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
152. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 542–43.
153. David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 968.
154. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934–35 (1989) (questioning this understanding of the
Enabling Act); Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 542.
155. E.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 2000).
156. These issues include the level of deference courts should afford agency interpretations
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A more complete justification for trans-substantivity treats the
principle as a response to various institutional limitations that
should cabin judicial lawmaking within certain boundaries. To
summarize, trans-substantivity operates as a “second-best.” 157 It
properly constrains doctrinal evolution where circumstances prevent
lawmakers from making legitimate, competent, and effective choices
for the design of process law. This is often the case when judges
assume responsibility for the creation and maintenance of process
law.

a. Lawmaking legitimacy. When courts craft substance-specific
process law, they tend to do so to pursue policy objectives that they
identify. Sometimes courts aim to boost or interfere with the
regulatory force of the antecedent regime. 158 Examples include the
favorable procedural treatment lower courts afforded Title VII claims
in the 1970s, as I address below. Sometimes courts deviate from the
trans-substantive norm to address problems of inefficiency,
inadequate participation, and other dysfunctions from which a legal
process for an antecedent regime may appear to suffer. 159 Adam Cox
has suggested, for example, that Judge Posner withholds deference
from Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretations of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) out of contempt for the
BIA’s competency. 160
Process doctrines offer decision-makers ways to alter how a legal
process realizes an antecedent regime’s policy objectives. If another
institution had crafted the antecedent regime in the first instance, a
clash of lawmaking prerogative can result. Concerns about the
legitimacy of judicial choices to mold the antecedent regime, and
thereby consciously alter how it gets implemented, arise
frequently. 161 Judges trespass on legislative terrain, so the argument

of statutes.
157. On the idea of the second-best, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Intepretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 914–15 (2003).
158. See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 247–55 and accompanying text.
160. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671,
1683–84 (2007).
161. E.g., Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 84–90 (1998) (discussing and criticizing
civil rights-specific summary judgment doctrine); Kim, supra note 116, at 43–44. Cf. Cover, supra

1228

DO NOT DELETE

1191

2/25/2014 1:26 PM

Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law

goes, when they develop particularized processes to advance ends
that they, not legislatures, select.162 Critics complain that judges use
subterfuge to boot, as they cloak what often amounts to a change to
the antecedent regime in the guise of process law. 163 In some
instances, this criticism might reflect a narrow understanding of
legitimate judicial power. But some particularly aggressive
deployments of process law must exceed the bounds of judicial
authority.164
Trans-substantivity constrains a judge’s policymaking flexibility
and thus protects against encroachments on legislative terrain. It
denies judges the authority to discriminate among substantive
regimes and thus to make arguably political choices better left to
coordinate branches. 165 Respect for a generality value may
particularly buttress a court’s institutional legitimacy. 166 If so, transsubstantivity as the value’s manifestation in process law contributes.
Subjected to trans-substantivity’s constraints, a judge tempted to

note 11, at 731 (“[T]here is something problematic about manipulation of a procedural
component to undermine the ostensible and articulated rule of law.”).
162. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1483 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring)
(“We must solve judicial problems, and we must not solve legislative problems.”); Cohen v.
United States, 650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a proposed exemption of IRS action
from judicial review, in part on grounds that “we are in no position to usurp [Congress’s]
choice” not to legislate such an exemption); Carl W. Tobias, Elevated Pleading in Environmental
Litigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 363–64 (1994); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil
Procedure Rulemaking; Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 666 (2010).
163. E.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013, 1091–92 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 84 (1994) (criticizing a Supreme Court decision interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code that cloaked a policy-driven result in formalist gloss as “flunk[ing] any
requirement of judicial candor”). One critic of the trans-substantive FRCP says that their
vagueness, a necessary feature of a trans-substantive system, enables judges to cloak substantive
policy preferences in individual case decision-making while employing nominally transsubstantive rules. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474–75
(1987). But see Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 776–79 (1993) (arguing against this indictment of the FRCP). This may be
so, but, for my purposes, it is beside the point. Doctrine still gets designed, whether it is
vacuous or not, and pressure on process law to splinter into substance-specific strains is real,
whether courts need the law-in-books substance-specificity in order to achieve the law-in-action
substance-specificity.
164. E.g., Eskridge, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 163, at 83–84 (discussing an example of
a case where the Court overstepped proper interpretive bounds).
165. Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067,
2076 (1989).
166. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 107, at 1013; Fuller, supra note 104, at 366–67.
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affect the antecedent regime through process law has a choice. She
can change the process rule trans-substantively, and thus cause all
sorts of unanticipated and unintended results for substantive areas
that do not concern her. Alternatively, she can leave the status quo
in place and let another institution, most likely the legislature,
address the issue with a substance-specific rule.

b. Competency. If trans-substantivity discourages policymaking
through process law, whatever legitimacy the principle purchases
may come at a cost, as I suggested earlier. A particular antecedent
regime may indeed work better if particularized rules sensitive to the
regime’s peculiar needs regulate the legal process involving it. This
cost weakens the case for trans-substantivity, however, only if the
decision-maker contemplating the substance-specific departure can
reliably identify such regimes and craft process rules that in fact
address the regimes’ dysfunctions.
As a general matter, judges may not be particularly competent to
make these determinations. To craft the right substance-specific
rule, a court must address two questions: Is the specific problem that
the court observes unique or systemic, and will a substance-specific
rule ameliorate it? To answer these queries properly, a court should
have data, expertise with their analysis, and metrics to evaluate
outcomes under the trans-substantive rule and the substance-specific
alternative. Inquiries of this sort differ considerably from the
standard types of deliberation in which courts engage. 167 Even if
judges could competently undertake data-driven analyses of
aggregate-level policy needs, the problem of bias remains. Judges
have not demonstrated any more capacity for dispassionate judgment
than any of us has. 168 Prejudice could interfere with impartial
assessments not only of which antecedent regimes operate suboptimally, but also of whether substance-specific process law could
help these regimes perform better. 169
167. E.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 12, at 309–10.
168. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 891–92 (2012); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2007).
169. For suggestions that bias might steer judges in substance-specific directions, see
generally Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999); Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory
Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37 (1991); Charles S. Ralston, Court v. Congress: Judicial
Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 205 (1990);
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Surely other decision-makers suffer from bias and maladroit
empiricism. But three features of the institutional structure within
which courts make decisions exacerbate the potential of these
deficits to distort process law. 170 First, litigation compares poorly
with other lawmaking processes in terms of the opportunities it
offers for broad public participation. Parties have robust
participatory rights, but restrictions otherwise limit nonparties’
abilities to bring information to the court that might inform the
contemplated substance-specific departure. 171 Judges rarely invite
the public to weigh in on possible decisions, as agencies do in
informal rulemaking. This comparative deficit makes a second
feature, the often-asymmetric stakes of the parties to a case, all the
more problematic. If one party is a repeat player, it will have an
incentive to bring to the court’s attention information about the
systemic effects of a process doctrine that is helpful to its long-term
interest. The other party, if a one-time litigant, may lack the
sophistication or incentive to make the countervailing argument,
informed by different information. Third, a single decision-maker, or
at best a small panel of decision-makers, makes judge-made process
law, whereas many lawmakers, with conflicting biases, participate in
agency and legislative lawmaking.
Trans-substantivity protects against inexpert, biased decisionmaking in the same way it safeguards lawmaking legitimacy, by
requiring respect for a generality value and thereby preventing
distinctions among antecedent regimes. A judge may think that,
because the EEOC has performed poorly, its interpretation of
antidiscrimination statutes should not receive the same deference
that other agency interpretations do. 172 But if the judge cannot craft
an EEOC-tailored deference rule, he will have two options. He will
have to apply the usual level of deference, or he will have to craft a
less deferential norm for all agency interpretations. Either way, the

Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270,
300–01 (1989); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925–27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons,
J., concurring & dissenting).
170. For commentary similar to what I offer in this paragraph, see generally Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 549, 577–78 (2002).
171. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (limiting intervention as of right in civil litigation).
172. Cf. Colker, supra note 169, at 160 (suggesting why courts do not want to defer to
EEOC interpretations).
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EEOC gets equal treatment. Given given barriers to an across-theboard decrease in deference, the judge will more likely leave the
status quo in place.

c. Coordination. When judges self-consciously set out to craft
substance-specific process law, they presumably do so not because
they want to advantage a specific litigant. Rather, judges believe a
substance-specific rule will produce better results across-the-board,
or improve the performance of institutions involved in legal
processes. A judge who refuses to extend Chevron deference to the
BIA presumably does so not to advantage a particular immigrant, but
because she thinks the agency is malfunctioning. The structure of
the federal judiciary gives reason to doubt the efficacy of this sort of
intervention, essentially an invitation to the BIA to get its act
together. 173 The individual judge’s prodding will probably achieve
little unless it is part of a coordinated message to the agency. But
rarely does anything formal coordinate decision-making from one
judge to the next in the federal judiciary. 174
Two types of coordination problems plague the creation of
process law in the judiciary. First, the institutional structure of
judiciaries may complicate efforts to devise a single approach for a
particular process law problem. Appellate review, the most obvious
coordinating device, 175 does not work particularly well to steer the
elaboration of judge-made process law in some unified way. Several
prominent attempts to craft higher pleading standards for civil rights
claims, for example, left a mess in their wake. The effort spawned
intra-circuit incoherence, 176 to add to garden-variety circuit splits.177

173. Cox, supra note 160, at 1683–84.
174. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is A They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 556–63 (2005); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty

Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105–16 (1987).
175. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 333 (2008).
176. In 1986, for example, the Ninth Circuit refused to “require alleged constitutional
violations to be pleaded with greater particularity than in other civil cases.” Bergquist v. Cochise
Cnty., 806 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1991, it expressly “adopt[ed] a heightened
pleading standard in cases in which subjective intent is an element of a constitutional tort
action[,]” with no cite to or discussion of its earlier decision. Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382,
1386 (9th Cir. 1991). For another example of intra-circuit inconsistency, see Cash Energy, Inc. v.
Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 899 (D. Mass. 1991) (Keeton, J.) (commenting on the First Circuit’s
“mixed signals” with respect to pleading requirements in Federal Tort Claims Act suits).

1232

DO NOT DELETE

1191

2/25/2014 1:26 PM

Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law

Obvious difficulties, like divisions among circuits, explain why
appellate courts do not solve the problem of coordinated
policymaking. 178 Features of procedural and interpretive doctrine
exacerbate the problem. Federal case law on statutory interpretation
lacks stare decisis effect. 179 The interlocutory status of many
procedural decisions and the fact of settlement as the dominant
endgame for civil litigation make opportunities for appellate
procedural lawmaking infrequent. A Supreme Court decision on
process law can exert considerable coordinating force. But the
Court’s extremely modest capacity sharply limits its ability to police
doctrinal evolution. 180 Trans-substantivity responds to this
coordination difficulty in a simple way. It limits the types of
variations in process law, thereby reducing the policy strains needing
coordination.
Even if an authoritative decision-maker could craft a substancespecific departure and ensure a coordinated response to a particular
problem of process law, a second difficulty, having to do with
spillover effects, emerges. Perhaps the Supreme Court wants to
punish the BIA for substandard decision-making by withholding
Chevron deference. The Court’s decision would solve the coordination
problem, since lower courts would necessarily follow its lead. If the
Court were to depart in this manner, however, it would invite lower
federal courts to do the same for other agencies that lower courts
believe are similarly dysfunctional. Cacophony in administrative law
could result. 181

177. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 583–90 (2002)
(describing complicated circuit splits after Leatherman); Raines v. Starkville, 986 F.2d 1418, 1993
WL 58707, at *5 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting circuit split pre-Leatherman); Karen M. Blum,
Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 76–77 (1994)
(same). For inter-circuit disagreement in another substance-specific pleading context, compare
Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring a securities fraud
plaintiff to plead “facts that raise a strong inference of fraudulent intent”), with In re GlenFed,
Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (permitting a securities fraud
plaintiff to plead scienter generally).
178. Vermeule, supra note 174, at 561–63.
179. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1908 (2011); Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to
Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872–84 (2008).
180. See generally Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law,
122 YALE L.J. 422, 426–31 (2012); Strauss, supra note 174, at 1117.
181. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (refusing to permit an IRS-specific
administrative law norm, on grounds that doing so would “too readily permit[]” exceptions from
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C. Process Law Made by Other Institutions
The foregoing argument for trans-substantivity works only for
judge-made process law. Trans-substantivity has no general
justification that should limit the legislative prerogative to enact
substance-specific process law. The wisdom of these departures can
only be evaluated individually, with particularized inquiries into the
needs of legal processes involving specific antecedent regimes.
Although some scholars have argued that legislatures trespass onto
inherently judicial terrain when they manipulate process law, 182 the
position is a minority one, 183 and legislatures likely enjoy broad
powers to legislate process law as they see fit. Put differently, the
process law that legislatures craft, trans-substantive or not, is every
bit as legitimate as any other statute they pass. 184 Their competence
to forge good-quality doctrine may be lacking. But there is nothing
peculiar about process law that uniquely limits the range of
legitimate legislative choice. Statutes also have the robust
coordinating power that a single judicial opinion lacks.
Trans-substantivity continues to influence procedural doctrine
fashioned in rulemaking processes, 185 and rightly so. Rulemakers,
such as those on the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee, might
not suffer from deficits of competency and coordination to the extent

the norm for other agencies). For a suggestion from the Court that this sort of logic has
influenced the trans-substantive design of criminal procedure doctrine, see Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
182. Jellum, supra note 138, at 879–97 (making a version of this argument for interpretive
doctrine); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1297–98 (1993) (making the argument for
procedural doctrine).
183. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1683–84 (2004) (responding to Mullenix’s argument); Rosenkranz, supra
note 127, at 2140 (arguing that interpretive statutes in the main are probably constitutional).
184. Another way to say this is to argue that generality as a value commands less deference
for legislation, which can more legitimately discriminate based upon political considerations.
Fuller, supra note 104, at 366–67.
185. E.g., Rule 23, October 1997, in Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 6–7, 1997,
Agenda Materials, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Minutes/cv10-97.htm (explaining that the Advisory Committee abandoned a mass tort class
action proposal for fear of Enabling Act problems); Minutes, Federal Civil Rules Advisory
Committee Meeting, Feb. 16–17, 1995, in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, 206 (1997) (“A specific mass torts
rule may seem so laden with substantive overtones as to raise legitimate doubts about the
wisdom of invoking regular rulemaking procedures.”).
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that individual judges devising doctrine do. 186 But the authority of
these committees to act as lawmakers remains in question decades
after their establishment.187 Were rulemakers to discriminate among
antecedent regimes for particularized procedural treatment, they
would put at risk the modicum of political neutrality that transsubstantivity otherwise offers. 188 Procedural rulemaking cannot
proceed entirely apart from politics, but there are degrees of politics
in the exercise. Those instances when rulemakers have proposed
specialized treatment for particular categories of litigation have
provoked particular resistance. 189
The sort of court I have had in mind up to this point is a federal
court. The trans-substantive justification for process law made by
common law courts differs. State judges face fewer legitimacy
obstacles to the creation of substance-specific process law,
particularly for common law claims that these judges create and
maintain in the first instance. 190 If state appellate courts can
meaningfully police the huge number of decisions that their lower
court colleagues render, well in excess of what federal district judges
handle,191 the coordination problem might recede as well. The
number of decision-makers needing coordination is lower, 192 and
many states have practices, such as a presumption against published
opinions, that decrease the total number of precedential decisions
that need to be harmonized. 193 To the extent that state process law

186. Marcus, Institutions, supra note 153, at 944–46.
187. Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 29
(1996). Cf. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 549 (discussing this issue).
188. Burbank, General Rules, supra note 10, at 542–43. In addition, were a rulemaking
committee to opt for substance-specific rules, it would have to make dozens of specific rules for
one issue instead of a generic one, and it would magnify the potential for institutional gridlock
fueled by normative disputes over translation problems that particular substantive regimes
ostensibly cause.
189. The maturity requirement the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee proposed in
the 1990s for mass tort class actions is one example. E.g., David Marcus, The Creation and
Renewal of the Class Action System, 1953–1999, at 101–04 (April 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
190. Burbank, Complexity, supra note 163, at 1475.
191. E.g., Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: “Neither Out Far Nor
In Deep”, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 715–17 (1995).
192. For example, about 100 judges staff the California Courts of Appeal, well below the
180 or so federal appellate judges.
193. E.g., CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF
COURT OF APPEAL OPINIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Nov. 2006).
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should remain trans-substantive, a concern for doctrinal coherence
might explain why. Lawmaking legitimacy plausibly counsels against
substance-specificity, even at the state level, when the antecedent
regime involved is statutory and thus made by the legislature.
Confusion in the application and creation of process law might ensue
were state courts to respect the trans-substantive norm in these
instances, but then routinely craft substance-specific rules when the
common law provides the antecedent regime.
Problems of legitimacy, competency, and coordination are hardly
unique to the generation and maintenance of process law. All law
that requires judicial elaboration suffers from these deficits. But
responses abound in process law. They include, for example, the Erie
Doctrine, the Chevron Doctrine, and a whole range of justiciability
doctrines. The trans-substantivity principle, as a second-best,
provides just one of many mechanisms that address judicial
institutional limitations.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINAL DESIGN
Few proceduralists have defended trans-substantivity, at least in
the abstract, as a principle of doctrinal design. 194 Particular
substance-specific departures in actual doctrine, in contrast, have
frequently provoked distress. The most notable substance-specific
procedural rules have caused consternation, 195 scholars rail against
exceptionalism in administrative doctrine, 196 and specific
interpretive practices for particular statutes have drawn critical
fire. 197 A gap divides theory from practice: trans-substantivity holds
little generic appeal, but, to judge by the commentary, decisionmakers departing from the norm keep getting it wrong.
This disarray in the literature on trans-substantivity reflects a
striking limitation. This scholarship has not yet offered a general
metric to judge substance-specific process law. In this Part, I use my
institutional justification for the principle’s persistence in judge194. In procedural commentary, the notable outliers are Paul Carrington and Geoffrey
Hazard. Carrington, Manifestly Unfounded Assertions, supra note 165; Hazard, Trans-Substantive
Virtues, supra note 73.
195. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
196. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 114, at 581.
197. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The Conflict
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 657–73 (2005) (arguing for an
end to specialized interpretive practices for the antitrust statutes).
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made process law to explain how and under what circumstances
trans-substantivity should persist in doctrinal design. A court may
craft a substance-specific process rule under circumstances that
mitigate the harmful effect of the court’s institutional limitations or
when other institutions are even more poorly-situated to do the job.
As a general matter, 198 when a court fashions a particular substancespecific rule, its desirability hinges in large measure on the goal the
court believes the new rule serves. A court can most likely overcome
its institutional limitations and properly craft a substance-specific
rule when the court does so to enable the legal process to achieve
the policy objectives in the antecedent regime more accurately.
My analysis also offers guidance for another problem of doctrinal
design. As I described in Part I, process law is often articulated in
trans-substantive terms but then lends itself to regularized patterns
of substance-specific application. In some instances, this doctrine
loses its trans-substantive character entirely and becomes
unambiguously substance-specific. Trans-substantivity as justified by
institutional considerations can inform the design of doctrine that
fits at this position on the spectrum. The principle can help decisionmakers craft trans-substantive rules such that these rules in
application do not move in a substance-specific direction.

A. Court-Made Substance-Specific Process Law
Most arguments for substance-specific process law make firstbest sorts of claims. 199 In one way or another, this advocacy asserts
that the process for resolving disputes involving a particular
antecedent regime will achieve better results with a substancespecific rule. Robert Cover engaged in this sort of analysis in his

198. On specialized courts and the wisdom of substance-specific doctrine they apply, see,
for example, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1995) (commenting on the Federal
Circuit’s ability to create a coherent, and thus coordinated, body of law); Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 12, at 313–16 (discussing the competency of the Federal Circuit to craft patent-specific
administrative law); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26–30 (1989).
199. E.g., Final Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on
Discovery and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, at 4 (April 15, 2009);
Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 13, at 45–56; Burbank & Subrin, supra note 119, at 412; Jay
Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1808–09 (1992); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 114, at 547–48.
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article that coined the term “trans-substantive.” 200 The first-best
approach is incomplete, however, if it ignores the institutional
setting in which the decision to deviate from the trans-substantive
norm must be made. The second-best inquiry, informed by the
justifications for trans-substantivity in the first place, asks whether
circumstances are such that the court can overcome its institutional
limitations and legitimately, competently, and effectively craft
substance-specific doctrine. For generalist courts, when they can do
so depends on the motivation for the substance-specific departure. I
describe possible motivations for these departures first, then
elaborate on my metric for substance-specific process law forged by
courts.

1. Motivations for substance-specificity
a. Fidelity. A judge might be tempted to depart from the transsubstantive norm if a substance-specific process rule would help a
legal process realize the policy objectives in the antecedent regime
more completely. As I describe below, particularized class action
doctrine for Title VII cases evolved in the 1970s for this reason, to
achieve the statutes’ broad remedial objectives more successfully.201
Judges also might want to develop substance-specific process law to
interfere with the realization of an antecedent regime. Doctrine
specific to the litigation of Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims, also
described below, developed in the 1970s to absolve defendants from
liability that courts found unattractive. Such departures either serve
or undermine what I call “fidelity.”
Process law pursues a fidelity goal when it steers decisionmakers toward resolutions that best achieve the antecedent regime’s
objectives in light of the relevant factual circumstances. The goal
particularly animates procedural and interpretive doctrine. 202

200. Cover, supra note 11, at 732–35.
201. See infra notes 240–41 and accompanying text; see also Note, Antidiscrimination Class
Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J.
868, 886 (1979).
202. Jeremy Bentham had something like fidelity in mind when he coined the term
“adjective law” to describe procedural and evidentiary doctrine. IX JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE: SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 477 (1827) (“[T]he system of
adjective law, is a means to an end. That end is, or ought to be, the execution of the commands
issued, the fulfillment of the predictions delivered, of the engagements taken, by the system of
substantive law.”). Charles Clark did as well when he insisted that procedural doctrine serve as
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Fidelity is not as dominant a goal in administrative law, 203 but core
doctrine manifests its pull. If Congress delegates rulemaking power
to an agency with instructions for its exercise, the agency acts
arbitrarily and capriciously if it does not heed them. 204 A great deal
of interpretive theory conceives of judges as legislative agents of one
stripe or another, with obligations of faithfulness to legislative intent
that the role requires. 205

b. Institutional efficacy. Many substance-specific departures in
process law—the standard the IRS uses to distinguish between
legislative and interpretive rules, for example, 206 or the deference
some courts withhold from EEOC interpretations of Title VII 207—
have little to do with fidelity, at least expressly. Some of this process
law deviates from the trans-substantive norm to pursue goals of
what I call “institutional efficacy.” Perhaps federal courts should
defer less to EEOC interpretations of Title VII than they otherwise
would to an agency’s statutory interpretation, for example, because
judicial competence to craft antidiscrimination policy compares
particularly favorably to the agency’s.208 Institutional efficacy is an

“a handmaid rather than [a] mistress” to “the work of justice.” Clark, Handmaid, supra note 73,
at 297; see also Charles E. Clark, Methods of Legal Reform, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 106, 111 (1929)
(“Procedure is a tool, a means to an end and not an end in itself. That end is the application of
rules of substantive law to the case in hand.”). Legal economists include accuracy as one of two
chief goals for a procedural regime. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.1, at
583 (7th ed. 2007). Lawrence Lessig uses the term “fidelity” to describe the “goal” of the
interpretive enterprise. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1173
(1993) (“I take as given the judiciary’s (at least feigned) commitment to fidelity [in textual
interpretation] as its goal.”); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365,
1371 (1997) (explaining what “fidelity” means).
203. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1675 (1975). Still, Paul Verkuil identifies the “accuracy of decisions” as a central objective
for administrative procedure. Verkuil, supra note 77, at 279.
204. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
205. E.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109,
113 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
415 (1989); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Book Note, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 919, 931 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1987)).
206. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, supra note 118, at 101–03.
207. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy:
Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 54–55.
208. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1252
(2001) (making this suggestion for the Supreme Court).
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umbrella category that covers a range of goals that relate to
imperfections in or limitations of the institutions involved in legal
processes. These goals include efficiency, optimal participation,
reasoned deliberation, comparative institutional competence, and
residual institutional legitimacy.
A number of scholars pair efficiency with fidelity as the twin
goals procedural doctrine serves. 209 A host of doctrines pursue cost
mitigation. Some, like expansive joinder rules, lower barriers to
entry for legal processes, while others, like discovery limits and case
management tools, provide mechanisms to protect against outcome
distortions that the expense of litigation might produce. Concerns
about inefficiencies in public administration have spurred various
reforms, such as direct final rulemaking 210 and deadlines for agency
adjudication. 211 Efficiency provides a normative yardstick for
varieties of interpretive theory as well. Some textualists, for example,
justify semantic canons of construction, such as expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, as defaults that spare legislators the costs of having to
anticipate all possible interpretive problems when they draft
statutes. 212
A variety of procedural and administrative doctrines attempt to
optimize participation. These doctrines balance access by those
affected by legal processes against harms caused by excessive or
insufficient participation. Examples include the law of res judicata and
notice-and-comment requirements for rulemaking. Doctrines that
calibrate the degree to which participant preferences should dictate
the outcomes of legal processes also fit into this sub-category. Rules
regulating civil settlement in various contexts 213 and the doctrine
governing negotiated rulemaking are illustrative.

209. E.g., Verkuil, supra note 77, at 279–80; POSNER, supra note 202, § 21.1, at 593; Robert
G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1160
(2006).
210. E.g., Guidance for FDA and Industry: Direct Final Rule Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg.
62466 (Feb. 21, 1997).
211. SCOTT SZYMENDERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33374, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
INSURANCE (SSDI) AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI): THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION
AND APPEALS PROCESS 3–4 (2006).
212. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983). Another
example from textualist interpretive theory is the argument that courts should not use
legislative history because it is too time-consuming and burdensome to sift through. Kenneth
W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377.
213. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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Reasoned deliberation offers a taproot of legitimacy for public
administration and civil litigation, two processes with tenuous
connections to mechanisms for democratic accountability. 214
Consistent with this idea, a wide array of doctrines push decisionmakers toward better quality decision-making. In administrative law,
these include grand obligations, such as those imposed by the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard for agency action. 215 They also
encompass more granular requirements, such as the requirement
that administrative law judges provide a reasoned decision to
support their social security benefit determinations. 216 When judges
act at the edge of their legitimate power in litigation, rules
particularly encourage reasoned deliberation. Rule 23 for class
certification decisions 217 and Rule 65 for the issuance of injunctive
relief function in this manner. 218
Doctrines frequently address concerns of comparative
institutional competence and administrative burden and thereby
respond to process problems that tax decision-makers’ capacities to
produce good resolutions. These doctrines reallocate decisionmaking authority from the comparatively incompetent institution to
the better-equipped one, 219 relieve the decision-maker of authority
altogether, 220 impose bright-line rules that deny decision-makers
discretion when they might exercise it poorly, 221 and provide
heuristics to assist decision-makers as they deal with particularly
technical or otherwise demanding problems. 222
Each of the foregoing institutional efficacy goals relates in some
manner or another to the legitimacy of litigation and public
214. E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 19–24 (2001); Owen M. Fiss, The
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983).
215. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 24–25.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2006).
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; e.g., Cortez v. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., 399 F. App’x 246 (9th
Cir. 2010) (vacating a district court’s denial of class certification on grounds that district court
“fail[ed] to explain its reasons”).
218. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(A).
219. E.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990)
(“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.”).
220. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (denying that courts could review an
agency’s refusal to take enforcement action).
221. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
222. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 658–59 (1992).
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administration as legal processes. To the extent that these specific
goals do not cover the landscape, residual institutional legitimacy, a
catch-all goal, explains additional contours of process law. The
avoidance canon is one example of a doctrine that does not quite fit
elsewhere but certainly involves institutional efficacy. Aggressive
judicial review might imperil the federal courts’ legitimacy if
unelected judges were to interfere with legislative outputs anytime
they could find a colorable constitutional infirmity. The canon
counsels courts to adopt a less natural reading of the statute and
thereby dodge its invalidation. It helps keep judicial powder dry for
cases that resist such finesse, 223 even if the canon steers decisionmakers to a less faithful reading of the statute. 224
My examples thus far show how process law responds to
institutional limits and dysfunctions as they arise during legal
processes. Sometimes process law pursues an institutional efficacy
goal more indirectly, by encouraging decision-makers to make up for
deficiencies in the institution that crafted the antecedent regime. A
lot of statutory interpretation doctrine functions in this manner.
Legislatures enact incomplete statutes for a variety of reasons,
including the limits of human foresight and strategic ambiguity as a
legislative tactic. Semantic canons of construction arguably address
this institutional deficit by providing off-the-rack meaning to fill in
the gaps. 225 Representation-reinforcing substantive canons work
analogously. Politically marginalized groups that lack robust
legislative representation sometimes benefit from canons that break
interpretive ties in their favor. 226
Fidelity and institutional efficacy are not the only goals process
law serves. Fairness to affected persons and entities, for example, is
another goal. The preceding discussion offers just an introduction to

223. E.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
397, 401 (2005).
224. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 784 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (complaining that
the Court’s use of the avoidance doctrine was tantamount to rewriting the statute to say what
Congress refused to say).
225. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 163, at 66–67.
226. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 869 (2012); EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 168–87 (2008).
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fidelity and institutional efficacy, enough to derive a normative
metric for substance-specific process law that courts develop.

2. When should judge-made process law be substance-specific?
Fidelity and institutional efficacy often motivate the design of
doctrines in process law, and they are therefore important to a
metric to evaluate substance-specific departures. Courts can most
likely overcome the institutional limitations I described in Part
IV(b)(2) with pro-fidelity departures, or deviations from the transsubstantive norm undertaken to resolve a legal process in a way that
more faithfully realizes the antecedent regime’s objectives. These
departures come in two varieties. The first variety of pro-fidelity
departures occurs when the antecedent regime itself encodes a
preference for substance-specificity; when courts craft a substancespecific rule for disputes involving the regime, they effectively
implement implicit legislative will. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the federal courts generally understood Title VII not as a device for
the individualized remediation of discriminatory workplace episodes,
but as a mandate for the reconfiguration of the American workplace
in favor of protected classes. 227 This understanding of Title VII had a
logical procedural corollary: to ensure judgments that actually
implemented this objective, federal courts should do what they could
to have Title VII cases proceed as class actions. 228 Courts heeded
this latent procedural preference by developing several substancespecific applications of class action procedure that all-but-guaranteed
the certification of broad Title VII classes. 229
The second variety of pro-fidelity departures finds its
justification in its effects, not implicit legislative will. The transsubstantive rule may not account for underlying conditions that
systematically frustrate the realization of the antecedent regime’s
policy goals, making a substance-specific rule necessary. One of the

227. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969); see also Hutchings
v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 1970); Evans v. Local Union 2127, Int’l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968).
228. During debates over the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the latent congressional
preference was made more explicit. See George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 688, 716 (1980).
229. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 639–43 (2013).
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examples Robert Cover offered in his famous treatment of transsubstantivity illustrates this point. A man left slaves to his legatees
with the instruction that the slaves be freed once Virginia law
permitted manumission. After the estate’s executor had been
discharged, Virginia law changed, but the legatees did not honor the
testator’s wishes. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals let the
discharged executor sue to enforce the will’s terms, even though the
ordinary rule denied discharged executors standing to do so. 230 This
law better realized the antecedent regime’s policy objectives. Virginia
law permitted manumission and privileged testator intent, policies
that the unanticipated circumstances would have frustrated had the
generic standing rule prevailed.
The institutional deficits that otherwise favor trans-substantivity
in process law cause less trouble for pro-fidelity departures. To the
extent that a court can connect its substance-specific rule to
instructions encoded within the antecedent regime, or to the extent
that a court neutralizes an obviously unforeseen impediment to the
realization of the regime’s goals, it derives the authority for its
policymaking venture from legislative will. The danger of judicial
usurpation of legislative prerogative lessens for that reason. The
need to justify a substance-specific departure in terms of legislative
will or preference protects at least partially against departures driven
by the judge’s bias or incompetent analysis. If evidence of this
implicit legislative will is reasonably clear, it also provides a
coordinating mechanism beyond the mere persuasiveness of the
judge’s reasoning to ensure that the departure achieves its intended
goal.
For analogous reasons, anti-fidelity departures, or departures
undertaken to frustrate the implementation of an antecedent regime,
have the most tenuous claim to legitimacy. These departures result
when the antecedent regime’s accurate realization provokes judicial
distaste. An example of this is the heightened pleading standards
that judges forged for civil rights litigants starting in the 1960s. 231
Depending upon how one views it, 232 the judicial revolt against the

230. Cover, supra note 11, at 724.
231. E.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 471–73 (1986). For an early case, see Valley v. Maule, 297 F.
Supp. 958, 960–61 (D. Conn. 1968).
232. Some courts justified their refusal to permit the certification of TILA claims by
arguing that Congress did not intend such huge liabilities for debtors. E.g., Kriger v. European

1244

DO NOT DELETE

1191

2/25/2014 1:26 PM

Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law

class certification of TILA cases might be another example. 233 TILA
provides for statutory damages that creditors must pay all nominallyinjured debtors. Claims brought for these damages fit the
requirements for class certification perfectly. They do not require
plaintiffs to prove individual causation or amount of injury, just the
defendants’ liability. In the 1970s, however, a number of district
courts blanched at certifying TILA classes. They believed that class
actions threatened defendants with aggregate liability in amounts
that vastly exceeded any real culpability for wrongdoing. 234 Hence,
these courts in effect wrote an exception for TILA claims into FRCP
23.
If the departure’s relationship to fidelity can help determine
whether the court surmounts its institutional deficits, then the goal
can also help decide the wisdom of substance-specific departures
motivated in the first instance by institutional efficacy. If these
departures have pro-fidelity effects, they may be more proper. Those
with anti-fidelity effects pose more difficulties. The district judges
who rebelled against notice pleading in 1950s-era antitrust litigation
did so chiefly on efficacy grounds. 235 The minimal pleading standard,
they believed, opened the door in big antitrust cases to dispiritingly
burdensome and inefficient discovery. But, the Second Circuit
opined, these judges had no business privileging this concern over
Congress’s intent to rid the American marketplace of anticompetitive
conduct. 236
Substance-specific departures taken for institutional efficacy
reasons pose the hardest evaluative problem when they have either
uncertain fidelity effects or no fidelity effects at all. The canon that
instructs judges to construe ambiguities in deportation statutes in
favor of immigrants has no effect on the accuracy of cancellation of
removal proceedings since the canon is supposed to apply only in
Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
233. E.g., In re Toys “R” Us-Delaware, Inc.-Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(FACTA) Litigation, No. 08-01980, 2010 WL 5071073 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2010) (discussing
TILA cases); David Marcus, From “Cases” to “Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Stability in
Civil Procedure, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1231, 1250–51 (2012); cf. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434
F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that such denials of class certification are borne of the
judge’s dislike of the operation of the substantive law); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623
F.3d 708, 722 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
234. Marcus, supra note 233, at 1250–51.
235. Dawson, supra note 81, at 431.
236. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957).
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instances of irreducible ambiguity in the INA. 237 Insofar as concerns
for judicial efficiency motivated it, 238 the maturity requirement for
class certification that evolved in mass tort litigation of the 1990s is
another example. 239 The requirement emerged from the idea that a
mass tort is “immature” until the litigation of individual lawsuits
reveal the tort’s legal and factual merit, as well as the central issues
that determine any individual plaintiff’s right to recover. 240 A few
courts followed the lead of influential commentators and declined to
grant class certification in cases involving so-called immature torts.
Defenders of the maturity requirement insisted that it had a profidelity effect: if courts certified immature torts, they argued, riskaverse defendants would settle without knowing if the payments
reflected claim value.241 Critics maintained that by thwarting class
certification, the maturity requirement robbed plaintiffs’ lawyers of
badly-needed economies of scale, took away their incentives to invest
in litigation, and thus prevented outcomes merited by the
substantive law. 242
Efficacy-driven departures from the trans-substantive norm, such
as the maturity requirement or the pro-immigrant canon, are
problematic, although less so than anti-fidelity departures. The
problem of lawmaking legitimacy lessens because the departure
either does nothing to interfere with legislative will (the proimmigrant canon), or it has a plausible pro-fidelity effect (the
maturity requirement). The problems of competence and bias
remain, however, as the criticism greeting judicial use of the
maturity requirement illustrates. 243 Also, the motivation for the
departure lies with the court’s own assessment of institutional need,

237. E.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 204 (D. Mass. 2004) (providing a
particularly thorough discussion of this canon).
238. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996).
239. For deployments of this requirement, see id.; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1297–98 (7th Cir. 1995); Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 212 F.R.D. 380, 389 (E.D. Tenn.
2002). For maturity as a substance-specific requirement, see Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Grant, 873 So.
2d 100, 102 (Miss. 2004) (Diskinson, J., concurring) (“I see no justification for carving out an
exception to the application of [Mississippi’s permissive joinder rule] for ‘mature torts.’”).
240. In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 610–11 (Tex. 1998).
241. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
242. David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special
Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 709–10 (1989).
243. E.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1357, 1424–28 (2003).
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and nothing externally-fixed, such as implicit legislative will,
coordinates decision-making.
Some substance-specific departures for institutional efficacy
reasons may nonetheless fall within the judge’s legitimate discretion.
The questions are whether any other institution can respond better
to the efficacy concern than the court can, and whether the efficacy
problem is one that requires coordinated policymaking to solve. In
other words, even if the court contemplating the departure suffers
from institutional deficits, perhaps alternate institutions suffer from
even worse deficits.
The pro-immigrant canon passes muster by the terms of this
analysis. Immigrants with contested claims to remain in the United
States have little voice politically. This particular disadvantage makes
Congress a comparatively inferior institution to weigh the merits of
the immigrant’s cause. The disadvantage also lessens the legitimacy
difficulties posed by judicial lawmaking. The pro-immigrant canon is
a good example of one of Einer Elhauge’s “preference-eliciting”
default
rules
for
statutory
interpretation. 244
Immigrant
underrepresentation makes a legislative response particularly likely,
were Congress to recoil at judicial interpretations of the INA that
favored immigrants too significantly. 245 The pro-immigrant canon
also does not require coordinated policymaking to have its intended
effect. When a court uses the canon to break an interpretive tie, it
responds to the problem of under-representation as the problem
affects the status of the immigrant involved in the particular removal
proceedings. The fact that other courts do not also deploy the canon
does not subtract from the benefit the canon yields when it does get
used.
The comparative institutional analysis comes out differently for
the maturity requirement. At least two alternative institutions
plausibly could have generated the requirement as an amendment to
Rule 23. The legislative dynamics favored the requirement’s
beneficiaries. Mass tort defendants had powerful congressional allies,
and trial lawyers, an otherwise powerful political lobby, split over
the wisdom of mass tort class actions. 246 Even had Congress been
244. See generally Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162 (2002).
245. Cf. ELHAUGE, supra note 226, at 168–87 (2008) (discussing how courts can elicit the
preferences of legislatures in cases involving politically underrepresented populations).
246. E.g., David Marcus, The Creation and Renewal of the Class Action System, 1953–99,
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hostile to coalitions that might have supported the requirement, the
Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee remained viable as a source.
In fact, the committee seriously considered an amendment to Rule
23 that would have created a maturity requirement. 247 Absent
evidence of legislative or rulemaking occlusion, other institutions
could have undertaken the substance-specific departure. Moreover,
at least in the 1990s when the requirement emerged, the
coordination problem was a real one. One court could deploy the
maturity requirement to deny class certification only to have another
jurisdiction’s court ignore the requirement and grant class
certification. The alleged harm that motivated the first court’s use of
the requirement would thus result.248

B. Trans-Substantivity and the Slide Toward Substance-Specificity
Trans-substantivity, conceived of as a “second-best” motivated
by institutional limitations, also has implications for the choice
between rules and standards in the design of process law. In Part I, I
distinguished between process law that is unambiguously substancespecific, such as the securities-specific pleading standard, and
process law that is articulated in trans-substantive terms but lends
itself to regularized patterns of substance-specific application. An
example of the latter is the Mead metric for determining when courts
should use Chevron to assess agency interpretations of statutes. I
observed that rules in this category can harden into unambiguously
substance-specific doctrine once an authoritative decision-maker
acts. 249
This second category of process law creates a problem that
resembles the challenge that substance-specific process law poses. A
court might apply a trans-substantive rule in a substance-specific
way because it believes that the costs of trans-substantivity for the
antecedent regime at issue outweigh the principle’s benefits.
Legitimacy, competency, and coordination problems may distort this
determination, just as they confound judicial decisions to craft
at 76–77 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
247. Id. at 99.
248. Cf. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133
(3d Cir. 1998) (describing the federal judiciary’s inability to enjoin a state court’s decision to
grant class certification that came on the heels of the federal court’s decision not to do so in a
mass torts case).
249. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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unambiguously substance-specific law. A number of commentators,
for example, have complained that the federal courts treat EEOC
interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with
particular skepticism. This judicial hostility may conflict with
congressional intent for the amount of deference the EEOC’s
interpretations should enjoy. 250 The particular aggressiveness with
which the federal courts have applied the nominally transsubstantive summary judgment standard in antidiscrimination cases
might reflect the influence of bias at a conscious or subconscious
level. 251
The prospect of poorly-applied process law should inform how
rulemakers devise trans-substantive rules. When a process doctrine
can plausibly take the form of a rule or a standard, the institutional
justifications for trans-substantivity counsel in favor of a rule. A
judge has to do more work to apply a trans-substantive rule in a
substance-specific way based upon his or her perceptions that a
particular antecedent regime would benefit from particularized
treatment. To do so, the judge has to announce an unambiguously
substance-specific exception, rather than cloak the particularized
application in the flexible generalities of a trans-substantive
standard. Authoritative decision-makers can thereby better police
these deviations from the trans-substantive norm. For at least fifty
years, an understanding of the federal pleading threshold that
couched the threshold in terms of a rule prevailed. During this
period, the Supreme Court rebuffed efforts several times to raise the
threshold for particular categories of claims. 252 The pleading
threshold softened into a standard in 2007, and as applied it may
have a disparate impact on particular categories of claims. 253 Given
the standard’s slippery language, authoritative decision-makers will

250. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1937, 1950–51 (2006); Colker, supra note 169, at 160. See generally Ruth Colker, The Mythic
43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (commenting on the
Supreme Court’s hostility to the anti-subordination intent of the Americans with Disabilities
Act).
251. E.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 710–12 (2007).
252. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 162 (1993).
253. E.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012).
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likely have more difficulty keeping it from sliding toward substancespecificity in application.
V. CONCLUSION
For a long time, academic discussion of trans-substantivity has
proceeded almost entirely within the narrow world of procedural
commentary. The principle became identified with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules are sacred to many a
proceduralist, and the principle thus assumed somewhat of a
mythical status. But trans-substantivity is not just a principle for the
design of procedural doctrine, and it certainly is not something
sacrosanct. Trans-substantivity is a prudential principle, one that
reflects and responds to the imperfections of institutions involved in
the processes of American law. As long as these imperfections
remain, the justification for trans-substantivity’s persistence does as
well.
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